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SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS
C Centigrade
CF Carbon Fibers
CF/m3 Carbon Fibers per Cubic Meter-density
CF sec/m3 Carbon Fiber Seconds per Cubic Meter "
. exposure
DMC Direct MaintenanceCost (in ]978 dollars)
E Exposure - carbon fiber seconds per cubic
meter
Mean Exposureto Failure
EF ExposureFactor
EF# ExposureFactor - AvionicsBay
EFD _ ExposureFactor - Flight Deck
Fs/mJ Carbon Fiber Seconds per Cubic Meter-exposure
G Transfer Function - carbon fiber Output to
input ratio
in inch
kg/min Kilogramsper minute
Ibs/min Pounds per minute
mm Millimeter
Pr(E) Probabilityof Exposure
Pr(URcF) Probabilityof Unscheduled.Removalbecauseof
Carbon Fibers
TF Transfer Function - carbon fiber output to
input ratio
,.o
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ASSESSMENT OF RISK TO BOEING COMMERCIAL TRANSPORT
AIRCRAFT FROM CARBON FIBERS
C. A. Clarke, E. L. Brown
Boeing Commercial Airplane Company
1.0 SUMMARY
The conclusions of the assessment are that electronic equipment annual repair
costs due to carbon fiber exposure are insignificant and flight safety is not
compromised by the effects of carbon fibers. It is recommended that new
applications of graphite/epoxy not be inhibited because of concern for carbon
fiber ingestion in aircraft.
When the Boeing 707, 727, 737 or 747 aircraft doors are closed and air
conditioning is derived from the main engines, carbon fibers do not enter the
flight deck or avionics bay. The fibers are broken up and filtered out by the
engines, air cleaners, and water separators. The systems are designed to be
self cleaning.
If the passenger door galley door, or avionics bay door is open, then the
possibility of free carbon fibers entering an aircraft, reaching electronic
equipment, and causing a malfunction may arise, expecially when the aircraft
is powered from ground power. After factoring in the Bionetics Corporation
data, however which shows that malfunction of the electronic eouipment
requires very high levels of carbon fiber exposure, and especially, the A. D.
Little, Inc. data which shows that an aircraft will experience an extremely
low probability of carbon fiber exposure, the result is an insignificant
annual "expected dollar loss" of from one to four dollars/year/aircraft for
removal and cleaning of electronic equipment in the 707, 727, 737, 747
aircraft. The expected dollar loss is for one aircraft at an air terminal.
The expected dollar loss is based on United States rate of 3.2 fire accidents
per year derived from Boeing, Lockheed, Douglas, and Federal Aviation
Administration records.
The annual expected dollar loss for the Boeing Commercial Airplane Company
fleet is an insignificant one hundred and forty-five dollars.
2.0 INTRODUCTION
This final report is organized to identify and describe the carbon fiber
released from an aircraft fire, carbon fiber characteristics, the number of
aircraft that may be exposed at an air terminal. 707/727/737/747 conventional
commercial aircraft operating modes at the air terminal, air conditioning air
paths and flow rates, CF transfer functions into an aircraft, vulnerable
avionic equipment, probabilities of removal, removal costs, and safety. The
annual removal cost, "expected dollar loss", from a single aircraft exposure
to carbon fiber is calculated for various aircraft, aircraft locations, and
exposure levels. The sub-task flow diagram for this investigation is shown in
Figure I.
Carbon fiber exposure levels and avionic equipment malfunction probabilities
were supplied by NASA. The "airframe manufacturers" - Boeing, Lockheed, and
Douglas cooperated extensively in the following tasks (see Figure I):
(I) survey airline fleet size, aircraft models and operating modes at
nine airports
(2) assess carbon fiber transfer functions into the aircraft
(3) catalog vulnerable avionics equipment
(4) develop cost data
(5) evaluate "unscheduled removal rates" and anticipate costs due to
carbon fiber exposure (expected dollar loss)
In the body of the report the aircraft operating modes (1) and the transfer
functions (21, are combined into a so-called "exposure factor" to improve the
handling of the extensive data developed on this program.
This final report also identifies some of the cause and effect relationships
and assesses the significant aircraft vulnerability/immunity parameters.
Results of this aircraft risk assessment are based on work conducted by the
Boeing Commercial Airplane Company, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington, 98124
under contract NAS1-15510 with GFRAPO,NASALangley, Hampton, Virginia.
The CFRAPOSystems-Vulnerability Manager was Jerry Humble. The Boeing Program
Manager was J. C. McMillan. Deputy Program Manager, S. D. Schneider. Task 2,
Principal Investigator, C. A. Clarke.
Major contributors to this program and report included:
R. B. Clarke -Safety
T. J. Gaseor - Air Conditioning Systems
G. K. Greene -Avionics
J. A. Johnson - Manuscript Preparation
R. N. Johnson - Environmental Control Systems
P. J. Leong - Power Subsystems
K. L. Waters Environmental Control Systems
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3.0 CARBON FIBER
3.1 CARBON FIBER FROM AN AIRCRAFT FIRE
The potential source of carbon fiber is from a postulated aircraft accident
scenario that occurs on or near an airport. Carbon fibers may be released
when parts containing carbon fibers burn and under suitable weather conditions
fibers are carried to other aircraft operating on the ground at the air
terminal. Carbon fibers do not originate from structurally sound
graphite/epoxy parts within an aircraft.
Previous studies in the CF risk analysis program determined, in detail,
historical fire damage to commercial aircraft and also projected the future
use of graphite/epoxy in commercial aircraft up to the year 1993. The fire
damage, type of fire, weather conditions, and number of exposed aircraft
(1993) have been established in a computer model to simulate a graphite/epoxy
aircraft accident at an air terminal. This computer simulation run output
provides to this study the amount of carbon fiber released per graphite/epoxy
aircraft fire accident, i.e.:
Exposure level (E)
for example, 107 CF sec/m3
at an exposed aircraft at an air terminal and the statistical probability of
that level occurring i.e.:
Pr (E)
for example 0.0004
and also the accident rate, for example 3.2 fire accidents per year. The
results and conclusions of this aircraft risk study are dependent upon these
exposure levels and probabilities.
3.2 CF CHARACTERISTICS
Graphite/epoxy is a layered construction of graphite strands or matting with
an epoxy filler formed to make structural panels or parts. In a
graphite/epoxy fire, the epoxy melts at 300 to 400°C and CF is released
(around lf,) or burned at 600 to 800°C. Single fibers (most less than 5 to 6
millimeters ), lint, and fragments are released. Heavy soot accompanies the
fire, but it's reported one can see (in the laboratory) a carbon fiber density
of ]05 CF/m3 in the air and an "exposure" level (E) of 106 or 107 CF
seconds/m3 deposited on a surface (Reference 3).
In the air, single fibers from a graphite/epoxy fire fall at 3 centimeters per
second, lint at 20 centimeters per second, fragments at 150 centimeters per
second. Tests indicate that carbon fibers are broken up to harmless lengths
of less than one millimeter when ingested in an aircraft engine or compressor
(Reference 1). If carbon fibers are assumed to enter an aircraft, lengths of
from one to five millimeters may enter avionics eouipment through the three
millimeter (1/8 inch) diameter cooling holes punched in the housing and cause
malfunction. The resistance of the fibers is two to six thousand ohms per
4
centimeter; they burn at 20 to 30 milliamps and above 100 volts. Carbon
resistivity is ].7 x 10-3 ohm centimeters and, for comparison, aluminum
resistivity is 3 to 5 x 10-6 ohm centimeters.
Tests within the NASA carbon fiber chamber have simulated extremely heavy
exposure levels of 107 or 108 CF sec/m3 by cutting carbon fibers to length and
inducting and diffusing them into a lab chamber onto aircraft avionic
equipment. These levels have caused avionic equipment to malfunction, but no
burnout or damage occurred. At these levels the equipment is literally
covered with black matted carbon fibers - easily visible. Operation returns
to normal after vacuuming (Reference 3).
The average exposure level (E) at which avionic equipment malfunctions is
defined as:
Mean Exposure ("E", "E bar")
for example, 1.5 x 107 CF sec/m3.
The results and conclusions of this aircraft risk study are dependent upon the
"mean exposure" (E').
A graphite/epoxy fire will create a certain density or concentration (CF/m3)
of carbon fibers in the air which may be deposited on an exposed aircraft.
This density (CF/m3) multiplied by the period of time in seconds (CF sec/m3)
an aircraft or piece of equipment is exposed is defined as Exposure (E).
4.0 CF TO EXPOSED AIRCRAFT
4.1 NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT
If a graphite/epoxy fire occurs near an air terminal, carbon fibers may be
deposited on one or a number of exposed aircraft parked at the terminal.
The next two sections will describe the identification of average number of
aircraft located at an air terminal, their operating modes when susceptible,
length of time in those modes, and carbon fiber paths and transfer functions
into the aircraft.
Boeing, Lockheed, and Douglas surveyed and determined the number of airlines
and their average fleet size located and operating at nine United States
airports. Boeing compiled data from LaGuardia, Logan, and Philadelphia. The
airlines were assigned a letter code. The number of aircraft models for each
airline and their location at the air terminals during the daytime and
nighttime were identified and the airplanes were categorized as "small" or
"large" and segregated.into groups either at the "gate/ramp" or away from the
gate/ramp called "maintenance". See Tables I, 2 and 3. The large aircraft
are 747, DC-IO, or LIOII. The small are 707, 727, 737, DC-8, DC-9. Medium
are DC-9-80, A300. (These categories were made to satisfy the requirement of
the risk assessment computer program.)
They are jet aircraft, either passenger or cargo, and are parked on the
ground. They are excluded if they are airborne, out-of-service, or propellar
driven. Note in the tables that, on the average, during the day there are
very few aircraft away from the gate (maintenance) at LaGuardia, Logan, and
Philadelphia but, on the average, there are a number of planes .parked at the
gate during the night. These aircraft are undergoing cleanlng and minor
maintenance operations for an average period of about four or five hours and
they are closed the rest of the night.
The Boeing data in Tables 1, 2, and 3, the Lockheed survey data, and the
Douglas survey data were all summarized in Table 4 and submitted by Douglas to
NASA and the risk analysis contractors for inclusion in the risk assessment
computer model. Thus, Table 4 presents a statistical sample of the average
ntlmber of aircraft that are exposed - open - to carbon fiber and parked around
the air terminals of nine major United States airports in the summer of 1979.
The totals of Table 4 are reduced and do not correlate with the relevant
totals of Tables 1, 2, and 3 to compensate for aircraft that are closed up
after cleaning and minor maintenance during a portion of the night. Aircraft
must be operating with electrical power on and doors open to be vulnerable to
CF.
•
Table 1.-LaGuardia International Airport
AverageNumber of Aircraft
Ai rl i ne
Letter Day Night Night
Code Maintenance Gate/Ramp Maintenance Model
A3 0 1 0 I -DC9
A4 0.I 4 9 13-727
D 0 2 0 1-727, I-DC9
E 0 13 2 6-DC9, 7-727
1-A300, 1-LIOII
N1 0 2 0 2-727
N2 0 0 2 2-727
P 0 0 i 1-737
R 0 2 0 2-DC9
T 0 5 7 12-727
U 0 3 0 1-727, 1-737, I-DCIO
0.I small. 30 small 21 small
2 Iarge
Table2.-Logan International Airport
AverageNumber of Aircraft
Airline
Letter Day Night Night
Code Maintenance Gate/Ramp Maintenance Model
AI 0 I 0 737 or DC9
A3 0.I 6 3 4-DC9, 3-727, 2-BACIII
A4 0 3 5 3-707, 5-727
B 0 3 0 2-727, 1-747
D 0 8 3 11-727
E 0.1 9 3 6-727, 1-LIOII, 5-DC9
N2 0 3 0 2-727, I-DCIO
P 0 I 0 1-737 (weekend)
R 0 I 0 I-DC9
T 2 2. 0 1-707, I-DC9
U 0 3 0 2-727, 1-737
2.2 small 37 small 12 small
3 large 2 large
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Table3.-Philadelphia International Airport
AverageNumber of Aircraft
Ai rl i ne
Letter Day Night Night
Code Maintenance Gate/Ramp Maintenance Model
A2 0 2 0 1-737, I-DC9 "
A3 0 2 0 1-727, BACIII.
A4 0 2 0 1-727, 1-707
B 0 I 0 1-727
D 0 2 0 2-727
E 0 3 0 3-727
N2 0 I 0 1-727
R 0 1 0 I-DC9
T 0.1 5 0 2-727, 2-707, I-LIOII
U 0.i 6 0 3-727, I-DC8, 2-DCIO
0.2 small 22 smalI 0
._ 3 Iarge
8
Table4.-Average Number of ExposedAircraft PerAirport
Airport Aircraft Day Night
Size Gate Maintenance Gate Maintenance
ORD SMALL 41.4 9.0 17.7 19.0
MEDIUM 2.8 0 1.4 1.0
LARGE 9.8 2.0 4.5 5.0
JFK SMALL 40.7 8.0 8.4 18.0
MEDIUM 3.8 0 1.6 5.0
LARGE 10.3 2.0 5.8 8.0
STL SMALL 17.2 2.0 6.1 4.0
MEDIUM 0.6 0 0.1 0
LARGE 0.6 0 0.4 0
LGA SMALL 18.3 0.1 13.2 20.0
MEDIUM 0 0 0 1.0
LARGE 0.8 0 1.1 0
BOS SMALL 14.9 2.2 16.7 13.0
MEDIUM 0.9 0 0.3 0
LARGE 2.3 0 1.3 1.0
PHL SMALL 8.3 0.2 9.6 0
MEDIUM 0.5 0 0.1 0
LARGE 1.5 0 1.9 0
DCA SMALL 16.1 0 9.7 0
ATL SMALL 30.7 10.0 25.5 16.0
MEDIUM 2.5 1.0 1.7 1.0
LARGE 4.1 2.0 3.9 3.0
MIA SMALL 19.0 4.0 29.7 8.0
MEDIUM 2.6 0 3.3 2.0
LARGE 5.9 3.0 5.1 6.0
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4.2 OPERATING MODE - EXPOSED AIRCRAFT
Aircraft, listed in Table 4, parked at the air terminal, must be in an
operating mode with the passenger door, the galley door, or the avionics bay
door open to be susceptible to carbon fiber entry into the flight deck or
avionics bay where most of the electrical/electronic equipment is installed in
equipment racks. The equipment "draw-through" air conditioning system must be
on. The following operating modes have been identified.
APU (PASS) - Auxiliary Power Unit is on and passenger door or galley
door open. This is the operating mode when the plane is on an
enroute stop or turn around. Some airlines clean and vacuum the
plane in this configuration, but an airline effort is underway (1979)
to minimize the use of the auxiliary power unit to conserve energy.
GND PWR (PASS) - Ground Electrical Power (fixed or mobile) is
operating and the passenger door open. This is the usual mode for
cleaning or maintenance. With ground power on, the electronic
equipment "draw-through" cooling system is on.
GNDPWR(AV) - Ground electrical power is on with avionics bay door
open. This is a possible mode for maintenance.
ENG(PASS) - Engines are on, passenger door open. This mode is for
an engine run up and checkout during maintenance.
It is also necessary to know the percentage of time aircraft are in these
susceptible operating modes. Aircraft modes and correlated time periods in
hours from surveys at Logan, Philadelphia, and LaGuardia are shown in Table 5.
The time periods in hours are summedand averaged, then totaled for all three
airports, then converted to operating time in percent. Table 5 is for
nighttime operation at the gate; daytime at the gate was also determined. The
operating mode periods of time for day and night operation at the gate are
summarized in Tables 6 and 7 for the various door configurations. These are
the periods (in percent) when an aircraft may be exposed during a twenty four
hour day. Aircraft that are closed up, airborne or parked (not vulnerable to
CF) are not included here. Table 6 shows, for example, that at night at the
gate with the ground electrical power on and with the avionics door closed,
the passenger door is open 50% of the airplane cleaning/checkout "operating
mode" GNDPWR(PASS). This means CF may enter the passenger door and transfer
into the aircraft.
Table 6 and 7 are for aircraft "at the gate/ramp". Lockheed determined
similar data for aircraft "away from the gate" (maintenance) shown in Table 13
in the next section.
These operating modes uniquely establish the carbon fiber transfer function
from outside to inside the aircraft. In other words, a specific transfer
function is assigned for each operating mode.
lO
DTable5.-Exposed Aircraft-Boeing Airport Survey
,ytVight Gate
LOGAN PHILA LGA
AIR- APU GND PWR ENG APU GND PWR ENG APU GND PWR ENG
LINE (PASS)(_) (7_T(PASS) (PASS)(P3_S-_)_(PASS) (PASS)(P_)_(PASS)
A1 Not AvaiIable N/A N/A
A2 N/A N/A N/A
A3 1 4 1 0.1 0.5 3 0.5 0.1 N/A
A4 1 5 2 0 0.5 3 1 0 1 0 4 0.1
B N/A 2 4 1 0.1 N/A
D 3 0 6 0.1 0.25 0 3 0 3 0 6 0
E 3 3 1 0.1 0.25 3 0.5 0.5 1 2 1 0.1
N1 N/A N/A 0.5 4 1 0.25
N2 0.5 4 1 0 2 4 1 0.1 1 2 1 0.1
P 0 3 1 0.1 N/A 1 2 1 0.1
R 0 3 1 0.1 0.25 4 3 0 1 2 1 0.1
T 1 8 0.5 0 2 4 1 0.1 0.5 4 1 0.25
U 0 3 1 0.1 1 5 0.25 0.1 0.5 4 1 0.25
AVG. _.05--3-.661.61 0.06 _.97 3._-_1.25 .11 -1_-05---2.221.8_-O-Z17F
HR.
APU GROUND POWER ENG.
(PASS) (PASS) (AV) (PASS)
Grand Total Hours _ _ 1.58 .10 Ave.
OperatingTime Percent 17% 53% 27% 1.7% Ave.
Rounded 18% 50% 30% 2%
Table6.-Exposed Aircraft PercentTime Summary- Night Gate,Avionics Door
OPEN CLOSED
PASSENGERDOOR PASSENGERDOOR
OPEN CLOSED OPEN CLOSED
APU _ 0 18% 0
ENGINE 0 0 2% 0
AIR CART 0 0 0 0
GROUND POWER 30% 0 50% 0
NONE 0 0 0 PARK
Table7D-ExposedAircraft PercentTime Summary- Day Gate,Avionics Door
OPEN CLOSED
P/_SENGERDOOR PASSENGERDOOR
OPEN CLOSED OPEN CLOSED
APU 1% 0 95% 0
ENGINE 0 0 O 0
AIR CART 0 0 0 0
GROUND POWER 0 0 4% 0
NONE 0 0 0 PARK
]!
5.0 AIRCRAFT CF TRANSFER FUNCTION
Three things are required in the evaluation of carbon fiber transfer from
outside to inside the aircraft:
1) Air flow rates into the avionics bay. This information was
needed to aid the NASArisk analysis contractors in the CF
testing program on avionics equipment and air conditioning
eauipment.
2) CF transfer functions, outside to inside the aircraft, to
reveal possible amount of CF reaching the avionics equipment:
CF reaching Avionics (E)
Transfer Function (TF) =
CF external to Aircraft (E)
(A transfer function may also be given for a component or a
particular section of the aircraft. It is the carbon fiber
output divided by the input and is unitless).
3) A combining of the transfer function (TF) and the aircraft
operating mode percent time, from Tables 6 and 7, to establish
a "factor" which determines the avionic equipment CF exposure,
i .e.:
TF X %Time = Exposure Factor (EF)
The "exposure factor" (EF) is defined as the transfer function
multiplied by the percent time the aircraft is in an operating
mode. It will be averaged to include all operating modes
occurring when the aircraft is at "day-gate" or "night-gate" or
"day/night maintenance". The exposure factor (EF) is a factor
that lowers the "exposure" (E) of internal eouipnient because of
the combined aircraft transfer function (TF) and limited time in
an operating mode.
5.1 AIR FLOW RATES
The Boeing 727-200 air conditioning computer program was run using standard,
cold, and hot day temperatures (based on ambient temperatures at nineteen
cities) to determine the flow rate of air from the engine bleed, or the
auxiliary power unit, through the air cleaners and water separator to the
Flight Deck and the Avionics Bay. Air flow rates are shown in Figure 2 for a
"standard day" 15°C (59°F) with the auxiliary power unit on.
5.2 CF TRANSFER FUNCTION
Air and carbon fiber paths into the aircraft are through open doors or the
pne_natic ground cart. The ground cart is seldom used and CF ingested into
the auxiliary power unit or main engine (turbo compressor for the 707) is
atomized. Figures 3 through 7 show the paths through the open doors to the
flight deck and avionics bay.
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In Figure 5, for example, an entry path may be through the passenger door with
the CF being pulled down the sidewalls of the cabin then through the louvers
along the base board and down into the avionics bay. The CF is drawn by the
avionics bay eauipment suction cooling system. Note that conditioning air
from the engine bleed is forced into the cabin and flight deck, but cooling
air for avionic bay eauipment is drawn through and out of the avionics bay by
the avionics bay cooling system and exhausted overboard. Avionics enuipment
is most vulnerable when main engines are off and avionics bay cooling system
is on, i.e., when electrical ground power is on - "GND PWR(PASS)" or "GND PWR
(AV)".
As the CF moves into the cabin, a certain amount of it will settle out and
some will continue through establishing a "transfer function". A transfer
function of 0.7 has been selected as a reasonable average for the cabin.
Figure 4 shows sections of the aircraft that have been allocated specific
transfer functions; the main cabin is G7, and therefore G7 eauals 0.7.
Table 8 gives each individual transfer function assigned to components and
sections of the airplane. NASA's risk analysis contractors measured the
transfer function of the air cleaner and the water separator with the
resulting data shown in Figures 8 and 9 (Reference 2). These data were
rounded off and conservative values selected. Also note that the main
engines, turbo- compressor, and APU are shown as having a transfer function of(1.5 whereas recent data has indicated a transfer function of 0.1 or less.
The product of the component and section transfer functions of Table 8 fin
accordance with Figure 4 and recognizing the unioue CF transfer paths of each
aircraft sho_m in Figure 3, 5, 6, and 7) determine the total transfer function
from outside to inside the aircraft. Tables 9 through 12 tabulate these for
the various operating modes and door configurations. For example, looking at
Table 8 and Table 10 to calculate the transfer function under conditions of
engine idle and doors closed on the 727, one would multiply G1, G2 {idle), G4
(low flow), and G7 or G8 (which are 0.5, 0.01, 0.001, 0.7) and obtain 3.5 x
10-6 which is rounded to 4 x 10-6 . Some of the transfer functions are not
calculated in this manner because of the effects of the air conditioning
bypass systems.
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Table 8.-Carbon Fiber Transfer Functions
Label Transfer Function Value
GI MAIN ENGINES/TURBOCOMPRESSOR 0.5
" G2 AIR CLEANER- IDLE 0.01
- HIGH POWER 0.001
G3 APU ONLY 0.5
APU/AFMCOMBINATION 0.6
G4 WATERSEPARATOR- LOWFLOW 0.001
- APU FLOW 0.005
- TAKEOFFPOWER 0.01
G_ HEATEXCHANGERS,DUCTS 1.0
G_ LOWPRESSUREGROUNDCART 1.0
G7 MAIN CABIN 0.7
Gn FLIGHT DECK 0.7
G_ PASS DOOR 1.0
GIO AVIONIC DOOR 1.0
Table 9.-707 Carbon Fiber Transfer Functions
OPERATING PENETRATIONS TRANSFERFUNCTION
MODE
FORWARD AVIONICS FLIGHT AVIONICS
PASSENGER DOOR DECK BAY
DOOR
ENGINE CLOSED CLOSED 1.2 X I0-_ 1.2 X 10-2
IDLE CLOSED OPEN 1.2 X I0 -z 1.0
OPEN CLOSED 0.7 0.7
OPEN OPEN 0.7 1.0
TAKEOFFPOWER CLOSED CLOSED 4 X 10-3 4 X 10-3
GROUND CLOSED CLOSED 0.2 0.5
ELECTRICAL CLOSED OPEN 0.5 1.0
POWER OPEN CLOSED 0.7 0.7
OPEN OPEN 0.7 1.0
GROUND CLOSED CLOSED 0.7 0.7
ELECTRICAL CLOSED OPEN 0.7 1.0
POWER OPEN CLOSED 0.7 0.7
AND OPEN OPEN 0.7 1.0
LOWPRESSURE
GROUNDCART
]?
0.01
Legend:
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Table 10.-727 Carbon Fiber Transfer Functions
OPERATING PENETRATIONS TRANSFERFUNCTION
MODE FORWARD AVIONICS FLIGHT AVIONICS
PASSENGER DOOR DECK BAY
DOOR
ENGINE 4 X 10-_ 4 X 10-6CLOSED CLOSED
IDLE CLOSED OPEN 4 X lO-U ].0
OPEN CLOSED 0.7 _.7
OPEN OPEN 0.7 1.0
TAKEOFF CLOSED CLOSED 4 X 10-6 4 X 10-6
APU CLOSED CLOSED 2 X 10-5 2 X 10-3
CLOSED OPEN 2 X I0 -_ 1.0
OPEN CLOSED 0.7 0.7
OPEN OPEN 0.7 1.0
GROUND CLOSED* CLOSED* 0.2 0.2
ELECTRICAL CLOSED* OPEN 0.2 1.0
POWER OPEN CLOSED 0.7 0.7
OPEN OPEN 0.7 1.0
*Air is entering the aft "outflow valve".
Tab_ 11.-737 CarbonFiber TransferFuncdons
OPERATING PENETRATIONS TRANSFERFUNCTION
MODE FORWARD AVIONICS FLIGHT AVIONICS
PASSENGER DOOR DECK BAY
DOOR
ENGINES CLOSED CLOSED 4 X I0 -6 4 X 10-6IDLE CLOSED OPEN 4 X _0-6 1.0
OPEN CLOSED 0.7 0.7
OPEN OPEN 0.7 1.0
TAKEOFFPOWER CLOSED CLOSED 3.2 X 10-5 3.2 X I0 -5
APU CLOSED CLOSED 2 X I0-_ 2 X 10-3
CLOSED OPEN 2 X 10-_ 1.0
OPEN CLOSED 0.7 0.7
OPEN OPEN 0.7 1.0
GROUND CLOSED* CLOSED* 0.2 0.2
ELECTRICAL CLOSED* OPEN 0.2 1.0
POWER OPEN CLOSED 0.7 0.7
OPEN OPEN 0.7 1.0
* Air is entering the aft "outflow valve".
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Tab_ 1_-747 CarbonFiber Trans_r Functions
OPERATING PENETRATIONS TRANSFERFUNCTION
MODE FORWARD AVIONICS FLIGHT AVIONICS
PASSENGER DOOR DECK BAY
DOOR
ENGINES CLOSED CLOSED 10"_ lO-!
IDLE CLOSED OPEN 10-_ I0-_
OPEN CLOSED 10-_ i0-_
OPEN OPEN 10-4 10-4
TAKEOFFPOWER CLOSED CLOSED 10-4 10-4
APU CLOSED CLOSED 10-_ 10-_
CLOSED OPEN 10-_ 10-_
OPEN CLOSED I0-_ I0-_
OPEN OPEN 10-4 10-4
GROUND CLOSED* CLOSED* 0.2 0.2
ELECTRICAL CLOSED* OPEN 0.2 1.0
POWER OPEN CLOSED 0.7 0.7
OPEN OPEN 0.7 1.0
* Air is entering the aft "outflow valve".
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These transfer functions for these operating modes and door configurations
will be combined with the average "percent time" in each mode to arrive at the
exposure factor, but these facts should be noted first, viz.:
" I) The transfer function values of 0.2 and 0.5 have been set at 0.7
and the very low values of 10-2 for the 707 and 10-3 or less for
" the 727/737 have been ignored to simplify calculations in the
following sections.
2) The flight deck door is assumed open. If closed, CF will not
enter there from the passenger door.
3) The 747 operating with engines on or APU on has a positive
pressure in the cabin which inhibits CF entry in the doors. A TF
of 10-4 is estimated. The 747 is actually less vulnerable than
the other aircraft, but the same transfer functions are used to
simplify calculations in the following sections and to provide a
747 comparison with the other aircraft.
Section 4.2, Tables 6 and 7, gave the percent time in each operating mode.
Those are now combined (including the Lockheed supplied percent time for day
and night maintenance) with the transfer function for each operating mode and
are listed in Table 13. For example, noting from Table 7 "DAY GATE", APU on,
Avionics Door Closed, the Passenger Door is open 95%; and noting from Table I0
"727 CARBONFIBER TRANSFERFUNCTIONS",APU on, Avionics Door Closed, Passenger
Door open, the transfer function is 0.7 to the Avionics Bay. The 95% and 0.7
are combined in Table 13 at DAYGATEunder Avionics Bay column AI.
Table 13 shows a summary of all operating modes versus aircraft location at
the gate or maintenance as a function of transfer functions and percent time.
It can be seen in Table 13 that certain modes/transfer functions dominate;
accordingly, it's possible to combine these into a so-called exposure factor.
Exposure factors are drawn from Table 13. For example, take the row for "DAY
GATE T " and note that 95% of the time the T]_ is 0.7 under AI and 4% of thetime oF7 under El adding up to a total of 99%uf the time the TF is 0.7 a_ day
gate. The TF of 1 for only 1% of the time under B1 turns out to be
- insignificant when averaging these values. In this manner, Table 14 is
established, which sums all operating modes of an aircraft at a particular
location. EFD is the Flight Data Exposure Factor and EFA the Avionics Bay.
These exposure factors now provide a modifying factor indicating, on an
average, the carbon fiber exposure which may be seen by vulnerable equipment
located on the flight deck or in the avionics bay.
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Table 13.-Transfer Function (TF) and PercentTime
AVIONICSBAY
APU ON ENG. ON GND. PWR. AIR CART
AI BI CI DI El FI GI
DAY GATET 0.7 1.0 - - 0.7 - -F
% TIME 95 1 0 0 4 0 0
NIGHT GATETF 0.7 - 0.7 - 0.7 1.0 -% TIME 18 0 2 0 50 30 0
DAY/NIGHT/
MAINTENANCETF 0.7 1.0 0.7 1.0 0.7 1.0 0.7% TIME 7 3 I i 14 73 I
FLIGHT DECK
DAYGATETF 0.7 .002 - - 0.7 - -
% TIME 95 I 0 0 4 0 0
NIGHTGATETF 0.7 - 0.7 - 0.7 0.7 -
% TIME 18 0 2 0 50 30 0
DAY/NIGHT/
MAINTENANCETF 0.7 .002 0.7 .002 0.7 0.7 0.7% TIME 7 3 I I 14 73 I
A1 - APUON, Passenger Doors Open E1 - Ground Power, Passenger Doors Open
BI - APUON, Avionic Doors Open FI - Ground Power - Avionic Doors Open
CI - Engines ON, Passenger Doors Open GI - Air Cart
DI - Engines ON, Avionic Doors Open
Table 14.-ExposureFactor(E F)
AIRCRAFTLOCATION
EQUIPMENT DAY NIGHT MAINTEN-
LOCATION GATE GATE ANCE
FLIGHT
DECK EFD 0.7 0.7 0.7
AVIONICS
BAY EFA 0.7 0.8 0.9
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6.0 VULNERABLEEQU.IPMENT
AND PROBABILITYOF REMOVAL
6.1 VULNERABLE EQUIPMENT
" The next two sections will describe the identification of vulnerable equipment
on the flight deck or in the avionics bay, the statistical probability that
the eQuipment will malfunction because of exposure to CF, the cost of removal
and cleaning, and the resulting total probable cost for one aircraft.
At least ninety-five percent of the major electrical/electronic (avionic)
equipment on the 707, 727, 737, 747 have been identified and categorized as
"sealed" or, if cooling holes (3 millimeter) are present, a "percent open" has
been estimated. See Figure I0 and Appendix A. Figure I0 shows the equipment
cooling holes or apertures, which may vary widely from approximately 5% to
100% coverage of the case, and the circuit cards and connectors, which may or
may not be protected by conformal coat, and the terminals, where a fiber may
settle and cause malfunction. Identification and characteristics of each unit
were documented on "Component Data Sheets" as shown in the following sample.
Electrical/electronic modules on the flight decks were also identified.
Motors, solenoids, transformers, horns, filters, blowers, speakers, and
connectors are practically all sealed and are not included. Burndey blocks
and relays were not individually identified because it's estimated that their
malfunction probabilities from exposure to CF will not significantly impact
this study. Flight deck instruments are sealed.
NASA risk analysis contractors measured the vulnerabilities to find "mean
exposure" (E) of an aircraft ATC transponder, VHF communication transceiver,
DME Interrogator, VHF-VOR/ILS, Flight Director System, relays, and Burndey
Blocks. Carbon fibers of various lengths were used (Reference 3).
Frem these measured vulnerabilities and also graphite/epoxy fire release data,
categories of mean exposures (E) at which avionic units malfunctioned were
specified by NASAfor all avionics equipment as follows:
o Category A, open unit - coated boards - unprotected terminals.
Assign all units an E = 108
" o Category B. open unit, uncoated boards, unprotected terminals,
Assign 1/3 of units an E = 1.5 X 107
- 2/3 _ = I X 108
o Category C, open unit, uncoated boards, protected terminals,
Assign all units an E = 108
All of the vulnerable eouipment on the 707, 727, 737, 747 are categorized
according to Category A, B, or C with an assigned mean exposure to failure {E)
as shown in the Tables in the next section.
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COMPONENTDATASHEET- SAMPLE
I. COMPONENTIDENTIFICATION
A. NAME
B. VENDOR
C. MODEL/P/N
D. AIRCRAFTMODEL 707 727 737 747
E. UNITS PER AIRCRAFT 2 2 2 2
F. SYSTEMNaviqation
2. ENCLOSURE
A. SEALED OPENX
NOTE: IF UNIT IS COMPLETELYSEALEDDO NOTCOMPLETE
THE REMAINDEROF THIS FORM.
B. COOLING- FORCED747 CONVECTIVEX
COOLINGAPERTURES10-50% .32 cm (1/8")
AIR FLOW 300, 172 9m/minINTERNALFAN YES NO X COMMENT
COOLINGAIR FILTERED YES NO _ TYPE OR
DESCRIPTIONOF FILTER
3. CONSTRUCTION
A. SUB COMPONENTS
i. PROTECTED-ALL MOST X SOME NONE X
(IF MOST, OR SOME,EXPLAIN_ May be conformal c_at
B. CARDS/CIRCUITRY
i. CONFORMALCOATING YES X NO
2. CARDMOUNTING VERTICAL X HORIZONTAL
3. CARDSPACING 1.25 cm
4. ORIENTATIONOF BOARDTO AIRFLOW Vertical and Horizontal
5. HIGH IMPEDANCECIRCUITS YES X NO
6. LOGIC CIRCUITS YES X NO - DIGITAL X
ANALOG X
7. COMMENTS-Transformers, Rs, C's, vertical mounted boards
approx. 150 termlnals on typical board, cards may or may
not be coated.
C. TERMINATIONS
i. CONNECTORS- PROTECTED X UNPROTECTED
2. TERMINALS- PROTECTED UNPROTECTED X
3. TERMINALSPACING .22 cm to .I cm
4. VOLTAGEBETWEENADJACENTTERMINALS115V & logic vo|tages
5. COMMENTS
4. VOLTAGES INPUT: 115 VAC
OUTPUT:
VOLTAGERANGE
PWRSUP 115V, 28V
5. POWERWATTSUnit A 70 to 80, Unit B -48
6. LOCATION- AVIONICS BAY X FLIGHT DECK
7. CRITICALITY - CRITICAL X REDUNDANTX 8. VULNERABILITY
NON-CRITICAL
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6.2 PROBABILITY OF REMOVAL FORMULA
Now that an exposure factor (EF), and a mean exposure to failure (E) for
equipment have been established, if the aircraft exposure (E) is given, the
"probability of eouipment removal" can be calculated. Figure 11 shows the
concept of aircraft and equipment exposure. For example, an aircraft is
assumed to be subjected to CF at the gate, carbon fiber enters the avionics
bay or flight deck, resulting in a probability of equipment removal according
to the exposure factor and dependent on the mean exposure as follows.
The exponential probability density function formula (random failure) is:
where URcF stands for,unscheduled removal because of CF and Pr [URcF] stands
for probability of removal.
The probability of removal is 0.63 when E = E (and EF is one). When the
exposure is high, the probability approaches one; when low, the probability
approaches zero.
A NASArisk analysis contractor evaluated, for this program, a large number of
components and equipment that had malfunctioned and then applied mathematical
and statistical "tests" to determine the adherence to or deviations from the
above exponential probability distribution (random failure) predictions. The
purpose was to determine if the exponential probability distribution applies
over the entire range of eouipment exposures to carbon fiber, with the
emphasis being on extrapolating back down to failure points at very low
exposure levels. It was found that certain units/components/eQuipment did not
meet an exponential curve fit. But, most did. It was decided that the random
failure prediction would be used to evaluate aircraft avionic equipment
because it is conservative and provides for a worst probable case prediction
of aircraft susceptibility to CF.
Knowing the probability of removal of the equipment due to exposure to CF, the
"dollar cost" to remove the equipment is needed to arrive at the probable
dollar loss figure for a single individual aircraft.
?
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7.0 REMOVAL COST
Removal (and repair) costs are derived from existing Civil Aeronautics Board
"Form 41" reports for each individual piece of avionic equipment. Line
removal, shop repair, material, overhead, and a "factor for non-reporting"
comprise the Direct Maintenance Cost (DMC) in 1977 dollars. The "factor for
non-reporting" was removed, labor rates were set at $I0.00 per hour, and an
overhead of 180% was utilized to arrive at an equivalent 1978 Direct
Maintenance Cost (DMC). Aircraft delay at the air terminals (or flight
cancellation because of equipment removal) and major overhaul costs are not
included. Where data was not available or was obviously not indicative of
actual direct maintenance costs, estimates were made; airline cost accounting
methods vary widely and influence these figures.
The Direct Maintenance Cost for each vulnerable avionic equipment in an
aircraft was evaluated and grouped for equivalent costs (central tendancy),
that is, avionics with DMC's of from approximately ten dollars to two-hundred
dollars have an average cost of $100.00. In the case of the 737 ("small
aircraft"), there were forty-five units with an average of $100, (see Table
15). These units were further separated into those with mean exposure (E) of
I X 108 and 1.5 X 107. They were then given EQUIPMENTGROUPnumbers, viz., I
and 2. Group I has 38 units and group 2 has 7 units.
The group DMC expected dollar loss is the product of the Quantity per
aircraft, the average cost, and the "probability of unscheduled removal due to
carbon fiber exposure". The sum of the group DMC's is the DMCor "expected
dollar loss" per aircraft.
Tables 15, 16, 17 and 18 give the expected dollar loss per 737 aircraft for
assumed exposure levels and for the three time and locations of Day Gate,
Night Gate, and Maintenance. EFD and EFA are from Table 14. This is the
"expected dollar loss" if one aircraft is assumed to be exposed to 3.2 X 107
etc., carbon fiber seconds per cubic meter. Note that the probabilities of
removal, Pr (URcF)' are Quite high for the high aircraft exposure level, 3.2 x
107. The maximumexpected dollar loss is close to $3000.
The "expected dollar loss" per exposure per aircraft was also calculated for
the 707, 727, 737. 747 airplanes for the various locations for an assumed
exposure level of I x 107. (See Appendix Tables B-] through B-12). The 737
exposure level (E) is 3.2 X 107 in Table 15 and 1 X 107 in the Appendix
Tables. Table 18 summarizes the losses - DMC's - if an aircraft .is directly
exposed to carbon fibers.
To determine dollar risk, these DMC's must be modified with the "probability
of aircraft exposure" per fire accident and annual fire accident rate.
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Table 15.-Expected Dollar Loss (1978 dollars), SmallAirplanes,Day Gate
E = 3.2 X 107
EFD = 0.7
EFA = 0.7
EQUIP. EOUIP. QTY AVG. COST GROUP
LOCATION GROUP PER PERUR E Pr(URcF) CF DMC
A/C (1978 $) S/EXPOSURE
AVIONICS BAY I 38 I x 108 0.201 764.00
$I00. °°
AVIONICS BAY 2 7 1.5 x 107 0.775 543.00
AVIONICS BAY 3 6 I x 108 0.201 543.00
$450. oo
AVIONICS BAY 4 2 1.5 x 107 0.775 698.00
FLIGHT DECK 5 I $300. oo 60.00
I x 108 0.201
FLIGHT DECK 6 18 $ 50. oo 181.00
Expected Dollar Loss Per Exposure Per Aircraft Total $2789.00
Table l_-Expec_d DolOr Lo_ (1978do1_), SmallAirp_ne, Night Ga_
E = 3.2 X 107
EFD = 0.7
EFA : 0.8
EQUIP. EQUIP. QTY AVG. COST GROUP
LOCATION GROUP PER PERUR E Pr(URcF) CF DMC
A/C (1978 $) S/EXPOSURE
AVIONICSBAY I 38 I x 108 0.226 859.00
$ 100 oo
AVIONICSBAY 2 7 " 1.5 x 107 0.775 543.00
AVIONICS BAY 3 6 I x 108 0.226 610.00
$ 450. oo
AVIONICSBAY 4 2 1.5 x 107 0.775 698.00
FLIGHT DECK 5 I $300 oo 60.00
" 1 x 108 0.20]
FLIGHT DECK 6 18 $ 50.°° 18].00
Expected Dollar Loss Per Exposure Per #ircraft Total $ 2948.00
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Table 17.-Expected Dollar Loss(1978 dollars), SmallAirplane, Maintenance
E = 3.2 X 107
EFD= 0.7
EFA = 0.9
EQUIP. EQUIP. QTY AVG. COST GROUP
LOCATION GROUP PER PERUR E Pr(URcF) CF DMC -
A/C (1978 $) S/EXPOSURE
AVIONICS BAY I 38 I x 1-08 0.250 950.00
$ I00. °°
AVIONICS BAY 2 7 1.5 x 107 0.853 597.00
AVIONICS BAY 3 6 I x 108 0.250 675.00$ 450.oo
AVIONICS BAY 4 2 1.5 x 107 0.853 768.00
FLIGHT DECK 5 I $ 300. °° 60.00
i x 108 0.201
FLIGHT DECK 6 18 $ 50. oo 181.00
Expected Dollar Loss Per Exposure Per Aircraft Total $ 3231.00
Table 18.-Expected Dollar Loss (1978 dollars), Small Airplane, Summary
ASSUMED
EXPOSURELEVEL (E) DAYGATE NIGHT GATE MAINTENANCE
CF sec/m 3
3.2 x 103 $ 0.41 $ 0.47 $ 0.52
3.2 x I0_4 4.1 4.7 5.2
3.2 x I0 _- 41 47 52
3.2 x lOb_ 404 442 489
3.2 x i0 z 2789 2948 3231 -
3O
28.0 PROBABILITY OF AIRCRAFT EXPOSURE AND ANNUAL COST
NASA's computer simulation run, developed by A. D. Little (see Appendix C),
provides to this study the statistical probability of at least one aircraft
exposure per fire accident (0.0004, for example) at an exposure level (_>I x
107 CF sec/cubic meter for example). NASAhas also provided to this study the
aircraft annual accident rate (3.2 fire accidents/year). From this
information, it is possible to develop an approximate estimate of the Direct
" Maintenance Cost on an annual basis for the purpose of obtaining a comparison
of the annual DMC due to probability of CF exposure and the annual DMC
existin 9 in practice today. This comparison indicates the significance or
importance of the CF cost risk.
The existing annual DMC is easily calculated by taking the product of the
direct maintenance cost and twice the "unscheduled removal rate" which is
given per I000 hours in CAB Form 41. (At an estimated aircraft utilization
rate of 5.7 hours per day, the rate per year, 365 days, works out to
approximately 2000 hours, twice the given I000 hours). Totals are shown in
Appendix B, the last 15ne.
The probability of an aircraft being exposed because of a fire accident to a
level in excess of I x 107 carbon fiber seconds per cubic meter was supplied
by NASA and is 0.0004, i.e., there's a chance of 4 in I0,000 that a single
aircraft parked at the air terminal will receive an exposure of 107 or greater
because of a single aircraft accident and fire at some location around the
airport.
So, to calculate the carbon fiber DMC, the product of the aircraft exposure
probability (0.0004) and the DMCper aircraft gives the DMCper aircraft per
accident. See Appendix B.
And, the DMCper aircraft per accident multiplied by the accident rate gives
the CF annual DMCper aircraft.
The CF annual DMCand the existin 9 annual DMCcomparisons are in Appendix
Tables B-I through B-12. The estimated CF DMC/year is about 0.005% to 0.01%
of the existing DMC/year (1978), which obviously indicates an insignificant CF
cost risk.
Table 19 summarizes an approximate annual DMC or expected dollar loss per
aircraft and shows the very low costs which vary from about a dollar to four
dollars at exposures in excess of I x 107. These annual costs are calculated
from the accident rate of the entire U.S. jet transport fleet.
31
Tab_ l_-Annual Expec_d Dollar LossSummary forAircra_ Type
707 Day gate $ 1.10 737 Day gate $ 1.43
Night gate 1.21 Night gate 1.59
Maintenance 1.25 Maintenance 1.75
727 Day gate 1.77 747 Day gate 3.52
Night gate 1.95 Night gate 3.60
Maintenance 2.13 Maintenance 3.87
Note: Annual expected dollar loss calculated using:
I. equipment "unscheduled removal" average costs in 1978 dollars
2. equipment "mean exposures" of 1 x 108 or 1.5 x 107
3. aircraft utilization rate of 2,000 hours per year
4. aircraft exposure probability of 0.0004 per aircraft
5. United States fleet accident rate of 3.2 per year
6. Exposure level, E _ 1 x 107
The annual expected dollar loss can also be calculated for the Boeing
Commercial Airplane Company1993 "fleet".
First, a simple frequency distribution table of probability of exposure
incidents and aircraft is extracted from the A. D. Little cumulative frequency
distribution (Table 11 in Appendix C). The cumulative distribution features
of the A. D. Little, Table II, for both aircraft and exposure parameters must
be considered when summing the total aircraft incidents. The probability of
all aircraft incidents resulting from exposure in excess of 107 CF sec/cubic
meter when summedis 12,685 x 10-6 •
Second, that quantity is multiplied by 3.16, because those aircraft subjected
to greater than 107 CF sec/cubic meter can be averaged at the geometric mean
(3.16) between 107 and 108. This same procedure is used to calculate the
number of aircraft at E : 3.16 x 106 and 3.16 x 105 exposure (3.16 x 104.
results become negligible). Note that the A. D. Little cumulative frequency
distribution table for E greater than 106 includes the frequency of incidents
for 107 and they must be subtracted out. Also note that these aircraft
incident probabilities must be "normalized" or scaled by dividing by 107
because the aircraft expected dollar loss (Appendix B) has been calculated at
the 107 exposure levels. In this calculation, the probability density
function formula used to calculate aircraft expected dollar loss is assumed to
be linear when in fact it is not; the error is considered not significant.
The probability of incidents of all models of aircraft subjected to an excess
of 105 CF sec/cubic meter is 65,201 x 10-6 or 0.0652.
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Third, this Quantity is multiplied by 3.2 fire accidents per year to convert
to an annual basis. The result is a probabilityof 0.209 aircraft incidents
per year.
The 1993 "Jet Fleet" percentageof small aircraft has been estimated for this
program at 20%. One-half of these are estimatedto be Boeing aircraft. Ten
percentof 0.209 is 0.0209. From appendixB, the averageexpected dollar loss
of Boeing small aircraft (707, 727, 737) is $1230, which gives a result of $25
annual expected dollar loss for Boeing small aircraft. The 1993 "Jet Fleet"
large aircraft percentageis 50%. Boeing large aircraft are estimatedat 20%.
From Appendix B, the average expected dollar loss is $2860, which gives a
result of $120.
The annual expected dollar loss for the Boeing Commercial Airplane Company
"fleet" is $145.
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9.0 SAFETY
The Boeing Company risk assessment, concerning the possibility of a hazard
(from avionic equipment malfunction) to continued aircraft operation after
exposure to carbon fiber, is based on evaluations of graphite/epoxyfire
characteristics,transportaircraft operationaland safety procedures,avionic
equipmentvulnerabilitiesto CF, interviewswith those experiencedin aircraft
safety within Boeing, and discussions with the carbon fiber program
participants,Douglasand Lockheed.
There are important reasons for believingthat there is insignificanthazard
to aircraft operation because of accidental graphite/epoxy fires and CF
exposure,but first it's necessaryto describe certain assumptionsmade during
the cost analyseson this programthat allow finite probabilitiesof equipment
malfunctionand thus finite costs to be developed. There are three:
One- The cost analysis data (costs for equipment removal after CF
exposure) are based on the assumption of extremely high CF exposure
(107 CF sec/m3). Based on this assumption,resultingannual costs are
finite, but insignificanton a statisticalbasis. There are no known
actual situations where carbon fiber exposure can reach these dense
magnitudes (107 CF sec/m3) in an aircraft without causing other
overriding problems,such as smoke or soot damage. If it is allowed,
however,that these magnitudescan exist, and if one makes a comparison
on an annual basis, the estimatedCF equipment removal costs or rate
comparedto actual 1978 removalcosts or rate is an insignificant0.01%
or less.
Two- The cost data are based on the assumption of random failures.
Tests by NASA's risk analysis subcontractorshave caused some avionic
equipment to malfunction at very high exposure levels (107
CFsec/m3),but insufficientdata exists to verify that the equipment
will malfunctionat lower exposure levels,that is, the probabilityof
malfunction could be zero for other than the extremely high CF
exposures. There is also the condition where multiple fibers are
required for malfunction. This dramaticallydecreasesthe probability
of malfunctionat low exposurelevels.
Three- The cost data are based on the assumption that the avionic
equipment is openly exposed before, during, and after an accidental
graphite/epoxyfire occurs and no action is taken to protect,limit, or
stop CF from entering an aircraft.
The following important reasons and information developed from this program
supportsthe belief that aircraftsafety is not compromised.
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What is known is that:
1) Boeing Aircraft are invulnerableto CF when closed up during taxi,
takeoff, flight, and landing because of engine and air conditioning
filtering. And equally important, a moving aircraft will pass quickly
througha CF cloud thus limitingtotal exposure.
2) Carbon fibers enter through an open passenger,galley, or avionic bay
door. CF does not presenta substantive,new kind of contaminate.
3) Avionics equipment require extremely high levels of CF exposure (107
CFsec/m3) before malfunction occurs. Burn out or damage does not occur;
equipmentis restoredto normal operationby vacuuming.
4) High levels of carbon fibers are apparent and visible. In a
graphite/epoxyfire, heavy soot and smoke accompanythe CF. Carbon fibers
mat and collect on the equipment or instruments. Such a conditionwould
be improbableand the need for cleanupobvious.
5) Standard pre-flight checkout will verify the operational status of
critical avionic equipmentthat may have been exposed to other than high
levels of CF exposure. Avionics subsystemswill not simultaneouslyfail
after a successfulpre-flightcheckout and aircraftflight safety does not
depend on single units, but on multiple redundancy.
These facts cause us to believe that aircraft safety is not compromised. In
the future, however, avionic equipment cleaning and standard checkout
procedurescould be implementedafter a graphite/epoxyfire at an airportas a
precautionarymeasure to further increaseconfidencein aircraft safety.
35
10.0 CONCLUSIONS
This risk study has identified and assessed significant transport aircraft
conditions at an air terminal and associated avionics vulnerability to carbon
fibers.
Ingestion of carbon fibers into an aircraft may occur when the doors are open,
but when a plane is closed during taxi, takeoff, landing, or when parked and
the engines or auxiliary power units are operating, carbon fibers are filtered
out by the engine and air conditioning system and internal avionics eouipment
are not exposed. When an aircraft is at an air terminal with the doors open,
the plane is usually operating with the auxiliary power unit on during the
daytime at the gate with passengers loading, and with ground electrical power
on during the nighttime at or away from the gate during ground servicing
operations. The specific operating mode, for example, doors open - auxiliary
power unit on, establishes the amount of carbon fiber that may enter the
aircraft and reach avionic equipment.
Avionic equipment is only vulnerable to malfunction when exposed to extremely
dense, visible levels of carbon fibers and can be restored to normal operation
by vacuuming.
As determined on this program, avionic equipment probability of malfunction is
directly proportional to aircraft probability of exposure, but is an
exponential function of direct aircraft (or equipment) exposure. If an
aircraft is ass_ed to be directly exposed to a very high level of carbon
fiber (107 CFsec/m3) the probability of an equipment malfunction can be for
certain units, 0.45. There are no known actual situations where carbon fiber
exposure can reach these dense magnitudes without causing other overriding
problems, such as smoke or soot damage.
If the equipment is removed for cleaning, the removal costs, as calculated for
this study, vary from about $50 to $600 in 1978 dollars. Aircraft vulnerable
units number from about 60 for the 707 to 175 for the 747 including "flight
deck modules"; 40 to 100 without the modules. The removal and cleaning cost,
"expected dollar loss", may be $i000 to $3000 after the plane is subjected to
an extremely high level of CF, but when adjusting these costs with the
aircraft probability of exposure (in 1993) and the annual fire accident rate,
the annual cost is reduced to $I to $4 per year, per aircraft. The estimated
CF DMC/year is 0.005% to 0.01% of the existing DMC/year (1978), indicating an
insignificant cost risk. The annual expected dollar loss for the Boeing
Commercial Airplane Company "fleet" is an insignificant one hundred and fortyfive dollars.
Although certain assumptions and estimates have been made to simplify
calculations in developing the aircraft and equipment vulnerability and
removal costs, it's believed they are consistently conservative and that the
above figures represent the upper bounds of cost.
In conclusion, the threat to jet transport aircraft is estimated to be so
insignificant that the carbon fiber question should not be a factor in
deciding whether or not to use graphite/epoxy for aircraft applications.
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APPENDIX A
EQUIPMENT LIST
SYSTEM - MANUFACTURER CONSTRUCTIONUNITS PERAIRCRAFT
EQUIPMENT CATEGORIZED: % OPEN 707 727 737 747
ELECTRICALPOWER "';
APU Accessory Unit Type 1 50 1
Battery Charger I 25 I i
2 40 1
Bus Power Control Unit 1 S 2
2 20
Bus Protection Panel I S I
2 S I
DC Voltage Booster I 50 1
Engine Accessory I 40 I
Generator Control Panel I S 3
2 4
Generator Control Unit I S 2
2 S 4
3 2O
Load Control Unit 1 S 3
2
3 S 4
Static Inverter I 100 I I 1
2 30
3 3O
Transformer/Rectifier 1 50 4
(TRU) 2 50 3 3
- 3 50
4 2O 4
Voltage Regulator I 40 3
2 30 4
S = Sealed Box
F = Fan
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SYSTEM MANUFACTURER CONSTRUCTIONUNITS PERAIRCRAFT
EQUIPMENT CATEGORIZED: % OPEN 707 727 737 747
NAVIGATION
ADF i 20 2 I i 2
2 I0
.3 S
Altitude Alerting I S i I I
Control 2
ATC Transponder 1 5 2 I i 2
2 90
3 S
4 I0
Compass Coupler I 15 2 2
DME Iterrogation I 10-50 2 2F 2F 2
2
3
4
Electronic Buffer i 20 2
Amplifier
Ground Proximity (GPWS) I S I I I I
Computer
Inertial Navigation (INS) I F 2 3
2 (filtered)
3 (not filtered)
Marker Beacon 1 S 1 1 1 1
2 2
3
Radio Altimeter I 30 i I i 2
2 50
3 5O
4 5O
=
Directional Gyro I S 2 2 2
Vertical Gyro I S 2 2 2
S = Sealed Box
F = Fan
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SYSTEM MANUFACTURER CONSTRUCTIONUNITS PERAIRCRAFT
EQUIPMENT CATEGORIZED: % OPEN 707 727 737 747
VerticalGyro (V/G) 1 S 2 2
SwitchingRelay
VHF NAV (VOR/ILS) I 5-40 2 2 2 3
2 50
" 3 S
4 50
Weather Radar 1 .F 2 2 2 2
Transceiver 2 Filter
3 Filter
Weather Radar 1 10-90 1 1 1 2
Indicator 2 S
COMMUNICATIONS
Audio Access. Unit 1 15 1
2 I
Cockpit Voice Recorder I S i i I I
2 S
Flight Recorder I S I I I
2 S
3 S
4 S
5 S
6 S
HF Transceiver I (Filtered) 2 2 2 2
2
3
Passenger Address 1 S I I 1 2
Amplifier 2 S
3 I00
SELCAL 1 S I 1 1
2 S
3 S 1
S = Sealed Box
F = Fan
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SYSTEM MANUFACTURER CONSTRUCTIONUNITS PERAIRCRAFT
EQUIPMENT CATEGORIZED: % OPEN 707 727 737 747
Tape Music Reproducer 1 30 I 1 1
2 30
VHF CommTransceiver 1 2 2 1 2 3
2 40
3 S
4 S
AUTOMATICFLIGHT CONTROL
Central Instrument I 25 1
Warning Computer
Comparator Warning 1 10 1 1 1
Monitor
AFC Aids Interface 1 10 1
Flight Data Acquisition I 20 I 1
Unit 2 20
3
Automatic Stabilizer 1 S 1
Trim Unit
Autopilot (A/P) Monitor I S I
& Logic Unit
Autopilot (A/P) Access. I 40 i
Unit 2 40 I
Autopi I ot I 2
Autopi 1ot I S 1
Access. Box. No. 1
Autopi 1ot 1 20 1
Access. Box No. I
Automatic Throttle I 5 I
Computer
S = Sealed Box
F = Fan
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SYSTEM MANUFACTURER CONSTRUCTIONUNITS PERAIRCRAFT
EQUIPMENT CATEGORIZED: %OPEN 707 727 737 747
i
FI ap/Slat Position 1 20 1
Flap Load Relief I i0 1
Gust Response Supression
Computer
- Beta I S 1
- MSAS 2 S I
Mach Trim Coupler I 5 I
Misc. Solid State Switch I 40 I
Overrotation Warning Computer
Pitch Control Channel 1 S 1
(Autopi 1ot) 2 S 1
3 S 3
Roll Control Channel I S i
(Autopi 1ot) 2 S 1
3 S 3
Stall Warning I S
Rate of Turn Rack I 15 I
Signal Summing (Attitude Warning)Safe Flight
Stabilizer Trim I 15 I
Yaw Damper Coupler I S I
Yaw Damper-Upper i S I
2 I0 I
Yaw Damper-Lower I S I
2 I0 i
S = Sealed Box
F = Fan
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SYSTEM MANUFACTURER CONSTRUCTION UNITS PER AIRCRAFT
EQUIPMENT .CATEGORIZED: % OPEN 707 727 737 747
FLIGHT DIRECTOR
Air Data Computer 1 10 1 1
(CentralAir Data 2 30
3 30 2
Computer) 4 10 2
5 1 1
Flight Director/
SteeringComputer 1 5 1 1 1
2
3 5 1 1 1
4
Flight Instrument 1 20 1
AccessoryUnit 2 50 1
InstrumentAmplifier
(IntegratedInstrument
System-11S) 1 20 2 2 2
2 20
LeadingEdge Flap 1 40 1
PerformanceData 1 10 1 1 1 1
Computer (New)
SteeringComputer/ 1 5 2 2 2
Flight Director
Total Air Temp - 1 2 1
TAT/EPR Computer
ICE AND RAIN
Window and Pitot Static 1 100 1
Window Heat Control 1 25 4 4
2 2
S = Sealed Box
F = Fan
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SYSTEM MANUFACTURER •CONSTRUCTIONUNITSPER AIRCRAFT
EQUIPMENT _CATEGORIZED: % OPEN 707 727 737 747
FIRE PROTECTION
Compartment Fire & Over- I 20-50 I i
heat Detection Unit
Fire Detection Unit 1 40 I i
AIR CONDITIONING
Air Conditioning 1 S i
Relay Unit
Cabin Press Control 1 30 I i i
Cabin Temperature Control 1 15 I
Electronic Turbine Control I I0 i
Zone and Pack Temperature I 15
Controllers zone 4
pack 3
LANDINGGEAR
Anti Skid Control Module 1 20 1 1 1 1
Auto Brake Accessory or I 50 I
Control 2 50 I
3 20 I
Landing Gear Accessory I 80 I I
2 40 i
S = Sealed Box
F = Fan
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APPENDIX B
EXPECTED DOLLAR LOSS
Table B-1.-Expected Dollar Loss (1978 Dollars), Avionics Groups
For 707 Airplanes (Aircraft Location: Day Gate)
Group Group Group
Equipment quantity averagecost _ Pr [URcF ] DMC$/group per per UR exposure
aircraft (1978 $)
1 108 0.0676 162.241 24
x
Z
O >- 100
<: 8 2 12 1.5 x 107 0.3729 447.48O .--
O c
_1 .o_ 1 O.0676 40.56I-- _ 3 2 x 1u-z 300
1.5 x 107 0.3729 111.874 1
LU -_U
= 5 1 150 10.14
_o 1 x 108 0J)676
._m
,-;" 6 18 70 85.18
DMC (expecteddollar loss)per exposure $857.47
peraircraft
• Removalprobability dueto CF per exposure
Pr [URcF] = [1-e-EF (E/E)]
whereEF = flight deckexposure,EFD = 0,7 or
avionicsbay exposure.EFA = 0,7
E(exposure)= 1 x 107
e Group DMC$/exposurecolumnisobtainedby multiplying
Pr [URcF] by quantity peraircraft andby groupaveragecost per UR (1978 $).
e DMC/E/aircraft x Pr [E] = $ 857 x 0.0004 = $ 0.34 DMC/accident.
o DMC/accidentx numberof accidents/yr= $ 0.34 x 3.2 = $ 1.10 DMC/yr.
o Comparison:$ 1.10 DMC/yr x 100= 0.006 %.$17,994 ExistingDMC/yr
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TableB-2.-Expected Dollar Loss(1978 Dollars), Avionics Groups
For 707 Airplanes (Aircraft Location: Night Gate)
t
Group Group Group "
Equipment quantity averagecost _ Pr ['URcF_ DMC$/group per per UR exposure
aircraft (1978 $)
z _ 1 24 1 x 108 0.0769 184.56
o__ 100
<: 2 12 1.5 x 107 0.4134 496.02
O
..j o
I- =_ 3 2 1 x 108 0.0769 46.14
z L
UJ
:_ 300
•0- 4 1 1.5 x 107 0.4134 124.02
uJ _ 5 1 150 10.14L 1 x 108 0J36768 18 70 85.18
DMC (expected dollar loss) perexposure
per aircraft $946.06
• Removalprobability dueto CF per exposure
J
whereEF = flight deck exposure,EFD = 0,7 or
avionicsbay exposure,EFA =0,8
E(exposure)= 1 x 107
• Group DMC$/exposurecolumnis obtainedby multiplying
Pr [URcF] by quantity per aircraftand by groupaveragecostper UR (1978 $).
• DMC/E/aircraft x Pr (E] = $ 946 x 0,0004 = $ 0.38 DMC/accident.
• DMC/accidentx number of accidents/yr= $ 0.38 x 3.2 = $ 1.21 DMC/yr.
• Comparison:$ 1.21 DMC/yr x 100 = 0.0067 %.
$17,994 ExistingDMC/yr
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Table B-3.-Expected Dollar Loss (1978 Dollars), Avionics Groups
For 707 Airplanes (Aircraft Location: Maintenance)
Group Group Group
Equipment quantity averagecost _ Pr[URcF J DMC$/
- group per per UR exposure
aircraft (1978 $)
Z _ 1 24 1 x 108 0.0861 206.64
O > 100
<: 2 12 1.5 x 107 0.4134 496.08
O _"
.-I O
I- "'_ 3 2 1 x 108 0.0861 51.66L=" 4 1 1.5 x 107 0.4134 124.025
CI -----"
uJ --_(3
= 5 1 150 10.14
"O
lx108 . .. 0.0676
_. 6 18 70 85.18
k.....
DMC (expecteddollar loss)perexposure $973.72per aircraft
@Removalprobability dueto CF per exposure
where EF = flightdeck exposure,EFD = 0.7, or
avionicsbay exposure,EFA = 0.9
E(exposure}= 1 x 10 7
• Group DMC$/exposurecolumn is obtainedby multiplying
Pr [URcF] by quantity peraircraft andby groupaveragecostper UR (1978 $).
e DMC/E/aircraft x Pr [E] = $ 974 x 0.0004= $ 0.39 DMC/accident.
o DMC/accidentx number of accidents/yr= $ 0.39 x 3.2 = $1.25 DMC/yr.
o Comparison:$1.25 DMC/yr x 100 = 0.0069 %. -$17,994 ExistingDMC/yr
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Table B-4.-Expected Dollar Loss (1978 Dollars), Avionics Groups
For 727Airplanes (Aircraft Location: Day Gate)
J
Group Group Group
Equipment quantity averagecost _ Pr [URcF ] DMCS/group per per UR exposure
aircraft (1978 $)
--
1 40 1 x 108 0.0676 270.40
z 100
._ 2 11 1.5 X 107 0.3729 410.19
.j o
z_ <_ 3 6 1 x 108 0.0676 182.52
L 45Oa. 4 2 1.5 x 107 0.3729 335.615
uJ _ 5 1 300 20.28
L 1 x 108 0.06766 48 50 162.24
DMC (expecteddollar loss}per exposure
per aircraft $1,381.24
°.
• Removalprobabilitydueto CF per exposure
Pr[URcF]=
where EF = flight deckexposure,EFD = 0.7, or
avionicsbay exposure,EFA =0.7
E(exposure)= 1 x 10 7
• Group DMC$/exposurecolumnis obtainedby multiplying
Pr [URcF] by quantity per aircraft andby groupaveragecostper UR (1978 $).
• DMC/E/aircraft x Pr [E] = $1,381 x0,0004= $ 0.55 DMC/accident.
• DMC/accidentx numberof accidents/yr= $ 0.55 x 3.2 = $ 1.77 DMC/yr.
• Comparison:$ 1.77 DMC/yr x 100 = 0.0084 %.$ 20,970 ExistingDMC/yr
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TableB-5.-Expected Dollar Loss(1978 Dollars), Avionics Groups
For 727 Airplanes (Aircraft Location: Night Gate)
- Group Group Group
Equipment quantity averagecost _- Pr[URcF ] DMC$/group per per UR exposure
aircraft (1978 $)
1 40 1 x 108 0J_76g 307.60
.1_. 2 11 1.6 x 107 0.4134 454.740 '-
_j o
_" "'_ 3 6 1 x 106 0.0769 207.63
z L"' 450----- 4 2 1.5 x 107 0.4134 372J}6
uJ -_
u 5_ 1 3OO 2O.28
"10
__ 1 x 108 0.0676
._o=
,T 6 48 50 162.24
DMC (expecteddollar loss)perexposure
per aircraft $1,524.55
• Removalprobabilitydueto CF per exposure
Pr [URcFI = _-e-EF(E/E) 1
where EF = flight deck exposure,EFD = 0.7, or
avionicsbay exposure,EFA = 0.8
E(exposure}= 1 x 107
• Group DMC$/exposurecolumnisobtainedby multiplying
Pr [URcF] by quantity per aircraft andby groupaveragecostper UR (1978 $).
• DMC/E/aircraft x Pr [El = $1,525 x 0.0004= $ 0.61 DMC/accident.
o DMC/accidentx numberof accidents/yr= $ 0.61 x 3.2 = $1.95 DMC/yr.
o_Comparison:$ 1.95 DMC/yr x 100 = 0.0093 %.$20,970 ExistingDMC/yr
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Table B-6.-Expected Dollar Loss (1978 Dollars), Avionics Groups
For 727 Airplanes (Aircraft Location: Maintenance)
Group Group Group
Equipment quantity ,rage cost _ Pr [URcF ] D MC$/group per per UR exposure
aircraft (1978 $)
Z F 1 40 1 x 108
0.0861 344.40
O
2 11 1.5 x 107 0.4512 496.32
O _"
.j o
I-" "Y 3 6 1 x 108 0.0861 232.47
z L"' 450=" 4 2 1.5 x 107 0.4512 406.085
O ------
LLI -_
=u 5 1 300 20.28
L 1 x 108 0.0676
6 48 50 162.24
DMC (expecteddollar loss)perexposure
per aircraft $1,661.79
• Removalprobabilitydue to CF per exposure
Pr[URcF] = [1-e-EF (E_)]
whereEF = flight deck exposure,EFD = 0.7 • or
avionicsbay exposure,EFA = 0.9
E(exposure)= 1 x 107
• Group DMC$/exposurecolumnis obtainedby multiplying
Pr [URcF] by quantity peraircraft andby groupaveragecostper UR (1978 $).
• DMC/E/aircraft x Pr [E] = $1,662 x0.0004 = $ 0.66 DMC/accident.
• DMC/accidentx numberof accidents/yr= $ 0.66 x 3.2 = $ 2.13 DMC/yr.
• Comparison:$ 2.13 DMC/yr x 100 = 0.010 %.
$20,970 Existing-DMC/yr
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Table B-7.-Expected Dollar Loss (1978 Dollars), Avionics Groups
For 737 Airplanes (Aircraft Location: Day Gate)
Group Group Group
Equipment quantity averagecost _ Pr [URcF ] DMC$/group per perUR exposure
aircraft (1978 $)
- z r 1 38 1 x 1_08 0.0676 256.88
0 > 100
V- ._
<:: 2 7 1.5 x 107 0.3729 261.03
o .__0 ,--
_ o
I- "'_ 3 6 1 x 108 0.0676 182.52L,,, 4504 2 1.5 x 107 0.3729 335.61
UJ -_u
= 5 1 300 20.2810
__ lx108 . . 0.0676
O)
,--
,, 6 18 50 60.84
DMC (expected dollar loss) per exposure
per aircraft $1,1 17.16
• Removalprobabilitydueto CF per exposure
Pr [URcF] = [I-e-EF `E/_)]
J
whereEF = flight deck exposure,EFD = 0.7, or
avionicsbay exposure,EFA = 0.7
E(exposure)= 1 x 10 7
• Group DMC$/exposurecolumnis obtainedby multiplying
Pr [URcF] by quantity per aircraft andby groupaveragecostper UR (1978 $).
• DMC/E/aircraft x Pr [E] = $1,117 x 0.0004= $ 0.45 DMC/accident.
• DMC/accidentx numberof accidents/yr= $,0.45 x 3.2 = $1.43 DMC/yr.
• Comparison:$ 1.43 DMC/yr x 100 = 0.0077 %.$18,493 ExistingDMC/yr
r
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Table B-8.-Expected Dollar Loss (1978 Dollars), Avionics Groups
For 737Airplanes (Aircraft Location: Night Gate)
Group Group Group
Equipment quantity averagecost - _ Pr L,jruRc'-I DMC$/group per per UR exposure
aircraft (1978 $)
z F 1 38 1 x 108 0.0769 292.22
o > 100
< 2 7 1.5 x 107 0.4134 289.38
0 c
_ o
I- "_" 3 6 1 x 108 0.0769 207.63L"' 450•_ 4 2 1.5 x 107 0.41:i4 372.06
u
= 5 1 300 20.28
"O
__ 1 x lu- 0.0676
.__
,T 6 18 50 60.84
DMC (expecteddollar loss)per exposure
per aircraft $1,242.41
• Removalprobability dueto CF per exposure
Pr[URcF] = [I-e-EF (E_,]
whereEF = flight deck exposure,EFD = 0.7 oor
avionicsbay exposure,EFA = 0.8
E(exposure}= 1 x 107
• GroupDMC$/exposure columnis obtained by multiplying
Pr [URcF] by quantity per aircraft andby groupaveragecost per UR (1978 $).
• DMC/E/aircraft x Pr [E] = $ 1_42 x 0.0004= $ 0.50 DMC/accident.
• DMC/accidentx numberof accidents/yr= $ 0.50 x 3.2 = $1.59 DMC/yr.
• Comparison:$1.59 DMC/yr x 100= 0.0086%.
$t8,493 ExistingDMC/yr
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TableB-9.-Expected Dollar Loss (1978 Dollars), Avionics Groups
For 737 Airplanes (Aircraft Location: Maintenance) t
Group Group' Group
Equipment quantity averagecost _ Pr L,jruRc=] DMC$/group per per UR exposure
aircraft (1978 $)
z [_'- 1 38 1 x 108 0.0861 327.18O > 100 -
< 2 7 1.5 x 107 0.4512 315.84
.__
O c
--I O
I- "'_ 3 6 1 x 108 0J3861 232.47
z L'" 450----- 4 2 1.5 x 107 0.4512 406.08
O
IJJ ._t
u= 5 1 300 20.28
1 x 108 0.0676
.__ - .
._o=
,'7 6 18 50 60.85
DMC (expecteddollar loss}per exposure
per aircraft $1,362.70
°.
• Removal probability due to CF per exposure
Pr [URcF] = [1-e-EF (E/Eli
where EF = flight deck exposure,EFD = 0:7, or
avionicsbay exposure,EFA = 0.9
7
E(exposure)= 1 x 10
• GroupDMC$/exposurecolumnis obtainedby multiplying
PR [URcF] by quantity per aircraftand by groupaveragecostper UR (1978 $).
• DMC/E/aircraft x Pr [E] = $ 1,363 x 0.0004- $ 0.55 DMC/accident.
• DMC/accidentx numberof accidents/yr= $ 0.55 x 0.32 = $1.75 DMC/yr.
• Comparison:$1.75 DMC/yr x 1130= 0.009 %.$18,493 ExistingDMC/yr
f
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TableB-lO.-Expected Dollar Loss(1978 Dollars),Avionics Groups
For 747 Airplanes (Aircraft Location: Day Gate)
Group" Group Group
Equipment quantity averagecost _ Pr[URcF ] DMC$/group per per UR exposure
aircraft (1978 $)
1 34 1 x 0.0676 229.84108
Z >" 100
.8_ 2 6 1.5 x 107 0.3729 223.74
0 c/ o
_- "_ 3 16 1x 108 0.0676 324.48LuJ 3004 3 1.5 x 107 0.3729 335.61
oIll ,"U
_ 5 16 600 648.96
1 x 108 0.0676
6 73 200 986.96
DMC (expecteddollar loss)per exposure
per aircraft $2,749.59
• Removalprobabilitydueto CF per exposure
Pr[URcF] = [1-e-El =(E/E)]
m
where EF = flight deckexposure,EFD = 0.7, or
avionicsbay exposure,EFA = 0.7
E(exposure}= 1 x 10 7
• Group DMC$/exposurecolumnis obtained by multiplying
Pr[URcF] by quantity per aircraft andby groupaveragecostper UR (1978 $).
• DMC/E/aircraft x Pr [E] = $ 2,750 x0.0004 = $1.10 DMC/accident.
• DMC/accidentx numberof accidents/yr= $1.10 x 3.2 = $ 3.52 DMC/yr.
• Comparison:$ 3.52 DMC/yr x 100 = 0.0051%.$69,592 ExistingDMC/yr
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Table B-11.-Expected Dollar Loss (1978 Dollars), Avionics Groups
For 747Airplanes (Aircraft Location: Night Gate)
Group Group Group
Equipment quantity averagecost _ Pr [URcF ] DMC$/
o group per per UR exposure
aircraft (1978 $)
z ['_ 1 34 1 x 108 0.07688 261.39
0 > 100
< 2 6 1.5 x 107 0.4134 248.04tJ .8O €
.-I o
I-- "_ 3 16 1 x 108 0.07688 292.14
z L"' 300a. 4 3 1.5 x 107 0.4134 372.065
O
iii -_U
= 5 16 600 648.96
"O
__ 1x 108 0.0676
__ 6 73 200 986.96
DMC (expecteddollar loss)perexposure
per aircraft $2,809.55
• Removalprobability dueto CF per exposure"
Pr [URcF] = [I-e-EF (E/_)]
whereEF = flight deck exposure,EFD = 0.7, or
avionicsbay exposure,EFA = 0.8
E(exposure)= 1 x 107
• Group DMC$/exposure column is obtained by multiplying
Pr[URcF ] by quantity peraircraft and by groupaveragecost per UR (1978 $).
• DMC/E/aircraft x Pr [E] = $2,810 x0.0004 = $ 1.12 DMC/accident.
• DMC/accidentx numberof accidents/yr= $ 1.12 x 3.2 = $ 3.60 DMC/yr.
• Comparison:$ 3.60 DMC/yr X 100 = 0.0052 %.
$-69,592 ExistingDMC/yr
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Table B-12.--Expected Dollar Loss (1978 Dollars), Avionics Groups
For 747 Airplanes (Aircraft Location: Maintenance)
Group Group Group
Equipment quantity averagecost _- Pr [URcF _ DMC$/group per per UR
aircraft (1978 $) exposure
z r_ 1 34 1 x 108 0.0861 292.74
0 > 100
2 6 1.5 x 107 270.72<o ._. 0.4512
O ,-
..j o
I- >
Z L 3 16 1 x 108 0.0861 413.28
_ 300
o. 4 3 1.5 x 107 0.4512 406.08
O
ILl .-_
u
= 5 16 600 648.96"O
_- 1 x 108 0.0676
.__
,'7 6 73 200 986.96
DMC (expected dollar loss) per exposure
per aircraft $3,018.74
O Removalprobabilitydueto CF perexposure
Pr [URcFJ = [1 -e-EF (E'E'_
i
where EF = flight deck exposure,EFD = 0.7, or
avionicsbay exposure,EFA = 0.9
E(exposure)= 1 x 10 7
e Group DMC$/exposurecolumn isobtained by multiplying
Pr[URcF] by quantity per aircraft and by groupaveragecostper UR (1978 $).
• DMC/E/aircraft x Pr [E] = $3,019 x0.0004 = $1.21 DMC/accident.
• DMC/accidentx numberof accidents/yr= $ 1.21 x 3.2 = $ 3.87 DMC/yr.
• Comparison:$ 3.87 DMC/yr x 100 = 0.0056$69,592 ExistingDMC/yr
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PROBABILITIESOF EXPOSUREOF JET AIRCRAFTAT MAJORU.S.AIRPORTS
I. INTRODUCTION
The purposeof thismemorandumis to sun1_arizean analysisperformedof
potentialcarbonfiberexposuresat majorU.S. airports. The resultsof
this analysiswill be utilizedin conjunctionwith a safetyanalysisand
a riskanalysisof electronic omponentswithinU.S. aircraft. The analy-
sis was performedby MonteCarlosimulationusingArthurD. Little's
carbonfiberdispersionand riskanalysismodel.
The major finding of the analysis is that probabilitiesof exposure that
can reasonably affect the electronicsystems of U.S. jet aircraft are
extremely small. The probabilityof a fire accident resultingin an
exposure of lO3 fs/m3 at either the gate or maintenancearea of a major
airport is 2.2%. - The correspondingprobabilitiesof exposuresin
excess of lO4, IOs, IOG, and IOT are 1.4%, .7%, .3%, and .04% respectively.
The probabilitiesof these exposuresaffectinggiven numbers of aircraft,
and breakdownsby day and night and by maintenance and gate areas are
presented in Section Ill.
The.conclusionswere based on certainassumptionsand simplifications.
The major assumptionwas that all of the aircraft in either the gate or
maintenance area woul-dexperiencethe identicalexposure in any fire
accident. Another way of lookingat this is that we assumed that air-
craft were for the purposesof the model locatedat the same point. Ex-
posure probabilitieswere computed analyzingexposuresat one mainten-
ance point and two gate points. A second major assumptionwas that at
any given point during the day or night the number of aircraft on the
ground would be equal to the average for the day or night period. Thus,
the probabilitieswere computed by determiningexposure probabilitiesat
given locationsand then assuming that all the aircraft in the gate or
maintenance area were locatedat these locations. These assumptions
lower the probabilityof any aircraft experiencinga given exposure but
increase the probabilitythat all planes experiencethe given exposure.
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It was also assumedwithin thecontext of the ADL dispersionmodel that
the direction and velocity of the wind would not change in the course
of the dispersion. This assumptionhas the practical affect of causing
a thin cloud to disperse in a given directionwithout any variationor
changes in direction. In actuality,a fire or explosionon or near the
airport may be subjectto some variationin speed and direction. However,
even allowing for error due to these assumptions,it is clear that signifi-
cant exposures at airport locationsare highly unlikely.
There are two major reasonswhy the exposure probabilitiesat airport
locationsare extremely small. First, under the most likely set of
release conditions a plume releasedoes not result in substantialexposures
at locationsclose to the source of the plume. Cases analyzed by Arthur
D. Little previously show that distance to the beginningof the lO3 con-
tour is usually several thousandmeters. If, as in the case of most
aircraft accidents, the locationof the fire is close to the airport then
the plume cloud will not result in high exposuresat the airport. The
second reason is that even in the case of an explosiverelease, the width
of the cloud is quite narrow at locationsclose to the source of the
accident. Thus, it is very unlikelythat an explosiverelease will af-
fect a particular location. This event will only occur if the wind di-
rection is preciselyin the directionof that location. Our model simpli-
fies the true situation by locatingall of the aircraft at a small num-
ber of points. Actual probabilitiesof any aircraft being covered by a
given exposure might be higher than estimated. To compensatefor this,
we assume that all the aircraft are exposed if any are.
The results presented in this memorandumare aggregated over all sizes of
aircraft because there is a great deal of correlationin the exposure
probabilitiesfor small,medium and large aircraft. It is not very
meaningful to present probabilitiesof exposure for small, medium, and
large aircraft taken separately.
II. METHODOLOGY
The analysis was performedin the following steps:
• For each of 9 major airportswe computer coded the
location of the maintenancearea and two central gate points
e We executed the Arthur D. Little carbon fiber dispersion
and risk analysis model to compute the probabilityof
exposure at various levels at the particular locations.
• For each,airport, we evaluated the probabilityof a given
number of aircraft being exposed during the day and night
operations by assuming that the average number of planes
on the ground are all locatedat a single point representa-
tive of the sample points used in the program.
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• We computedthe nationalprobabilityof exposurefor a
givennumberof planesby mixingthe individualairport
probabilitiesaccordingto the numberof estimatedopera-
tionsof aircraftcarryingcarbonfibers. As noted,the
assumptionthat all of the aircraftare locatedat a given
pointoverestimatesthe probabilitythatany planewill be
coveredby a givenexposure.On the otherhand,it under-
estimatesthe probabilitythat all of eitherthe gateor
maintenanceaircraftcan experiencea givenexposure.
The gate and maintenancearea coordinateswere determinedfrom airport
maps and were computed in relation to the centroid of the airports run-
ways. The precise distanceswere extremelyimportantin the analysis
and hence the assumptionsof accident locationsin the risk analysis
model should be reviewed. For each airport,a probabilitydistribution
for the given runway was input and accidentstaking place off the runway
were locatedaccording to a model based on historicaldata. Takeoff
and landing accidents taking place on or near the airport were assumed
to take place at the center of the appropriaterunway. Static and taxi
accidentswere assumed to take place near the gate area and were there-
fore locatedbetween the two gate locationsutilized for exposure sam-
pling.
The dispersionmodel is the modifiedmodel being utilized by Arthur D.
Little in its national risk assessmentbeing performedfor NASA. This
model is the same as the model presented in a previous report except for
the followingmodifications:
• Time of burn, percentof fuel burned and percent of carbon
fiber structuresconsumedare based on a probabilisticdis-
tributionconstructedfrom a data base of 92 fire and.ex-
plosion accidentscompiled by Lockheed,Douglas, and Boeing.
Correlations.amongthese variableswere implementedand the
distributionfor percentof carbon fiber structures coDsumed
is consistentwith a structuraldamage model developed by
Lockheed.
o Carbon fiber usage on aircraft is consistentwith the pro-
duction forecasts up to an including1993 by the three airframe
manufacturers. Fleets of aircraft that use carbon fibers
are assumed to be split equallyamong the airframe manufacturers
appropriatefor each size of aircraft.
e Maximum percentage of carbon fibers released is assumed to be
I% and 4% for plume and explosivereleases respectively.
• Maximum fuel loads are consistentwith the types of aircraft
that are dominating the 1993 fleet mix.
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• Probability of explosiverelease is conservativelyestimated
to be 15%. This is consistentwith the 92 fire and explosion
accidents compiled by Lockheed,Douglas, and Boeing. This
estimate _s conservativein a sense that not all of these
explosions representburns followed by an explosion. The
probabilityof an explosive release is higher than 15% for
take-off accidents taking place on or near the runway and
slightly lower than 15% for landing accidents.
In the next step of the analysis,probabilitydistributionswere estimated
usingthe modelfor eachof the nine airportsat the maintenanceand the gate
areasconditionalon therebeinga fireaccident. Theseconditionaldis-
tributionsare presentedin TableI.
In the next step of the analysis the conditionaldistributionsrepresented
in Table l were combined with the statisticsof the number of planes at
each airport during the day and night in the gate and maintenancearea to
produce a distributionof number of planes being exposed to a given ex-
posure.
In the final step of the analysis we assumed that every fire accident will
occur at one of the nine airports. By making this assumptionwe can use
the nine airports to project a national risk profile. In order to perform
the final step, it was necessaryto.compute the conditionalprobability
that an accident occurred at a particular one of these nine airports given
that it occurred at one of the nine airports. The equation utilized in
computing these probabilitiesis
Prob Ciis proportionalto(estimated1993 operations)x
(weatherfactor)x (percentCF)
Derivation of the weather factor and the estimated1993 operation are
presented in the Arthur D. Little report for Phase I. The percentage
of CF represents the percentageof operations at a given airport in 1993
thatwill involve aircraft utilizingCF. These percentageswere estimated
utilizing the airframer estimatesfor percent of 1993 fleets carrying
CF andprojections of operationsmixes by aircraft type at each given
airport. Factors utilized in the computationand the conditionalprob-
ability of each major city are presentedin Table 2.
To estimate the conditionalprobabilitythat an accident occurs during
the day and night operations,we examined operations statisticsat two
airports and accident times for the 92 accidentscited previously. For
Boston, the percentage of operationstaking place during the night hours
is 6% and for Washington, D.C. and Atlanta the percentagesare 3.5% and
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22% respectively.The percentageofnight accidentsin the data base
is 25%. (Thesewere the only data available).We, therefore,equate
the nighttimeprobabilit_of an accidentat Washingtonto be 3.5%x the
probabilityof an accident.For Boston,and for othercitiesthatwe
judgedto be mainlydaytimeairportsweestimatedthe probabilityof an
accidentoccurring'duringthe nighttimehoursas 6% x the probabilityof
an accident. ThesecitiesincludedBoston,LaGuardia,Philadelphia,and
St. Louis. For the otherairports,Atlanta,Chicago,Kennedy,and Miami,
- whichwe judgedto be active24 hour airportswe estimatedthat the
probabilityof an accidenttakingplaceduringthe nighthoursis 25%
x the probabilityof an accident. This estimateis consistentwith the
statisticsfromthe 92-accidentdata base and the operationsdata from
Atlanta. We used the 25% figureratherthan 22%sincethereseemsto be
some evidencethatnightoperationsinvolveslightlymore risk.
The conditionalprobabilitythat an accidenttakesplaceat a givenair-
portalongwith the day-nightprobabilitieswere utilizedin constructing
the overalldistributions.Theseare presentedin the next section.
IIi. RESULTS
The aggregatedistributionsfor the number of aircraft experiencinga
given exposure value ar_ presentedin Table 3 through 6. These tables
representthe four conditionsof interestwhich are day and night for gate
and maintenance. Tables 7 through I0 present the aggregatedand main-
tenance distributionsand Table II representsthe overall distributions.
As noted previously,the conditionalprobabilityof aircraft being exposed
to moderate exposure values is very low.
To convert these probabilitiesto annual values, each of the probabilities
should be multipliedby 3.2 to representthe number of accidentsoccurring
in a year. Thus, for example,the conditionalprobabilityof lO or more
planes being exposed to an exposureof IOs or greater is .69%. The annual
probabilityof exposinglO planes or greater to IOs or greater exposure"
is 3.2 x .69% or 2.2%. Table 12 through 20 are the analog of Tables 3
through II on an annual basis.
In order to estimate the size of the aircraft involvedTable 21 presents
the average fleet mix for aircraftexposed for each of the different
situations.
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TABLEI
CONDITIONALEXPOSUREDISTRIBUTIONSAT GATEAND MAINTENANCE
AREASFOR NINEAIRPORTS
Airport: JFK
ProbabilityThBt Maintenance ProbabilitythatGate
Exposure(fs/m3) Exposure ExceedsValue ExposureExceedsValue
103 .014 .0125
lO4 .008 .0080
lO5 .004 .0030
lO6 .0015 .0015
lO7 0 0
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/
TABLEl (CONTINUED)
CONDITIONALEXPOSUREDISTRIBUTIONSAT GATEANDMAINTENANCE
AREASFOR NINEAIRPORTS
Airport: Chicago
ProbabilityThatMaintenance Probabilitythat Gate
Exposure(fs/m3) ExposureExceedsValue ExposureExceedsValue
lO3 .0165 .0105
lO4 .0085 .0080
lO5 .0040 .0045
lO6 .0005 .0030
lO7 .005
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o,
TABLEl (CONTINUED)
CONDITIONALEXPOSUREDISTRIBUTIONSAT GATEAND MAINTENANCE
AREASFOR NINEAIRPORTS
Airport: Miami
ProbabilityThat Maintenance ProbabilityThat Gate
Exposure (fs/m3) .... Exposure ExceedsValue Exposure Excceds Value
103 .022 .Ol18
104 .Ol15 .0063
105 .005 .0033
lO6 .0025 .O00B
lO7 .0005 .0003
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TABLEI (CONTINUED)
CONDITIONAlEXPOSUREDISTRIBUTIONSAT GATEAND MAINTENANCE
AREASFOR NINEAIRPORTS
Airport: Atlanta
ProbabilityThatMaintenanceProbabilityThat Gate
Exposure(fs/m3) ExposureExceedsValue ExposureExceedsValue
103 .016 .Oil8
lO4 .0105 .0078
IO5 .007 .0033
IO6 .003 .0008
107 .0003
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TABLE] (CONTINUED)
CONDITIONALEXPOSUREDISTRIBUTIONSAT GATEAND MAINTENANCE
AREASFOR NINEAIRPORTS
Airport: LaGuardia
ProbabilityThat Maintenance ProbabilityThatGate
Exposure(fs/m3) __ExposureExceedsValue ExposureExceedsValue
103 .0075 .O103
104 .0045 .0073
105 .0030 .0048
106 .0015 .0023
107 .0008
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TABLEl (CONTINUED)
"CONDITIONALEXPOSUREDISTRIBUTIONSAT GATE AND MAINTENANCE
AREASFORNINEAIRPORTS
Airport: DC National
ProbabilityThatMaintenance ProbabilityThat Gate
Exposure(fs/m3) ExposureExceedsValue ExposureExccedsValue
lO3 .017 .014
104 .OlI .0095
lO5 .OlO .0070
lO6 .0055 .0040
lO7 .0005
6?
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TABLEl (CONTINUED)
CONDITIONALEXPOSUREDISTRIBUTIONSAT GATEAND MAINTENANCE
AREASFOR NINEAIRPORTS
Airport: Boston
ProbabilityThatMaintenance ProbabilityThat Gate
Exposure(fs/m3) ExposureExceedsValue ExposureExccedsValue
"lO3 .006 .0009
lO4 .004 .0006
lO5 .002 .0005
lO6 .O001
lO7 .000025
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TABLEI (CONTINUED)
f
CONDITIONALEXPOSUREDISTRIBUTIONSAT GATE AND MAINTENANCE
AREASFOR NINEAIRPORTS
Airport: Philadelphia
ProbabilityThatMaintenance ProbabilityThatGate
Exposure(fs/m3) ExposureExceedsValue ExposureExceedsValue
lO3 .0165 .OLD5
lO4 .0090 .0065
lO5 .0035 .0060
lO6 .0005 .0030
lO7 .OOlO
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TABLEl (CONTINUED)
CONDITIONALEXPOSUREDISTRIBUTIONSAT GATE AND MAINTENANCE
AREASFOR NINEAIRPORTS
Airport: St. Louis
ProbabilityThat Maintenance ProbabilityThat Gate
Exposure (fs/m3) ExposureExceedsValue Exposure ExccedsValue
lO3 .0105 .0075
lO4 .008 .0D45
lO5 .0055 .0015
IO6 .0015 .0005
107
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TABLE2
COMPUTAIIONOF THE CONDITIONALPROBABILITYOF A CITY
Estimated Weather
1993 Op Factor % CF Probability
Atlanta 433,434 1.09 .54 .159
Boston 171,897 1.06 .63 .072
Chicago 599,339 1.04 .72 .280
Kennedy 289,275 1.05 .81 .154
LaGuardia 213,724 1.05 .61 .085
Miami 249,330 .65 .78 .079
Philadelphia 138,520 1.04 .60 .054
St. Louis 165,764 .99 .50 .051
Washington 189,295 .87 .64 .066
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TABLE3
PROBABILITYCONDITIONALON AN ACCIDENTTHAT n OR MORE
PLANESARE EXPOSEDTO AN EXPOSUREOF E OR LARGER
Case: A99regateGateDay
ExposureE (fs/m3)
103 104 105 106 107
2 ,G0_00 .005700 .o0_000 .0_1',50,000_I=
4 .008500 .005700 .003000 .00!"50 .000_12
7 .008500 ,005760 .003000 .O01U50 .000_I:
I0 .008500 .005760 .003000 .001"50 .0007!2
ii .007900 .005260 .00:800 .001350 .00026=
12 .007900 .005300 ;002800 .001750 .000_62
13 .007900 .005360 .002000 .001-_50.000:6:
14 .007900 .0053o0 .002800 .001250 .000,"62
16 .007a00 .0053o0 .002800 .001350 .000:62
18 .007000 .00a760 .002300 .001150 .O00_,q3:
Number of 19 ,006o00 .OOUSO0 .002200 .001120 ,000_30
Planesn 20 ,005_00 ,007900 .001800 ,000920 .000170
21 ,005800 ,003900 .001800 ,000920 ,000170
24 .005600 ,002900 ,O01BO0 ,000920 ,000170
25 ,005600 .003900 ,001800 ,000920 ,000170
28 ,005000 ,003900 .001800 .000920 ,000170
31 .005100 .00-_500 ,001600 .000870 .{)00150
37 .005100 .003500 .001o00 .O00670 .000150
38 .003700 .002o00 .001200 .000770 .000110
54 .00_700 .002_00 ,001200 .000770 ,OOCllO
55 .001500 .000900 .000300 .000170".O0000O
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TABLE4
PROBABILITYCONDITIONALON AN ACCIDENTTHAT n OR MORE
ARE EXPOSEDTO AN EXPOSUREOF E OR LARGER.
Gate Night
Exposure E (fs/m3)
103 104 1OS 106 i07
2 .0020_" .001"2o .000681 .000337 .000065
4 ,00203_ .00:I_26 ,C00681 .000_37 .000065
7 .00203_ .00!"26 .000681 .000?37 .0000o_
10 .00201_ .001u12 .000676 .000335 .00006_
ii .00198_ .001_92 .000662 .000327 .0000o.:
12 .00198" .001392 .000662 .000_27 .00000--
13 .00195" .001372 .0006a2 .000318 .000062
14 •00195a .001.7.=.0006"2 .000318 .O000ol
16.00190u .001932 .000622 .000306 .QO00.:o
18 .O01aO, .001032 .000502 .0002_6 .000056
19 .001_00 .001030 .000500 .0002_6 .0000.:8
20 .001"00 .001030 .000500 .0002_6 .O000".-s
21.001aoo .001030 .000500 .0002_.6.0000.:8
24 .001-00 .001030 .000500 .0002_6 .000058
25 .000700 .O00U30 .000200 .0000_6 .00C018
28 .000700 .000,30 .000200 .0000-6 .000018
31 .000700 .000"._0 .000200 .0000=6 .000018
37 .000200 .000130 .000070 .000016 .000006
38 .000200 .000130 .000070 .000016 .000006
54 .000000 .000000 .000000 .000000 .000000
55 .000000 .000000 .000000 .000000 .000000
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TABLE5
PROBABILITYCONDITIONALON AN ACCIDENTTHATn OR MORE
PLANESARE EXPOSEDTO AN EXPOSUREOF E OR LARGER
Case: AggregateMaintenanceDay
ExposureE (fs/m3)
lO3 lO4 lO5 lO6 lO7
2 .009!00 .,005160 .002800 .000°20 .0000_0
4 .008200 .OOU500 ,002a00 .000_50 .0000_0
7 .OOb200 ,OOU500 ,002_00 .000850 .00003_
10 ,006900 .003o00 ,002100 ,000700 .000030
ii ,005300 .003000 .001600 .000500 ,000000
12 .001900 .001200 ,000800 .O00uO0 .O000CG
13 ,001900 .001200 .O00BO0 .O00uO0 .O000CO
Number of 14 .000000 .000000 .000000 .000000 .000000
Planesn 16 .000000 .000000 _000000 .000000 .O000CO
18 .0ooo00 .o0ooo0 .ooo0oo .oo0oo0 .ocoooc
19 .000000 .000000 .000000 .O000GO .O0000C
20 ,000000 .000000 ,000000 .000000 .O00OCO
21 ,000000 ,000000 .000000 ,000000 ,000000
24 .000000 .000000 ,000000 .000000 ,000000
25 ,000000 .000000 ,000000 .000000 .O0000C
28 .000000 .000000 ,000000 .000000 .OOOGO0
31 .000000 .O00000 .000000 .oooco0 .O000CC
37 .000000 .000000 .000000 .000000 ,000000
38 ,000000 .000000 ,000000 .000000 .000000
54 .000090 .000000 .000000 ,000000 .000000
55 .000000 .000000 ,000000 .000000 .000000
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TABLE6
PROBABILITYCONDITIONALON AN ACCIDENTTHAT n OR MORE
ARE EXPOSEDTO AN EXPOSUREOF E OR LARGER
MafntenanceNight
ExposureE (fs/m3)
103 104 105 106 107
2 .002270 .0012u0 .000615 .000163 .000010
4 .00:_70 .001Z,0 .000o15 .000!o3 .000010
7 .O02Z_O .001220 .000595 .000158 .000010
10 .00_2"0 .001220 .000395 .000158 .000010
ii .0022"0 .001220 .000593 .000158 ,00001C
12 .0022u0 .001220 .000595 .000158 .000010
13 .0022"0 .001220 .000595 .000158 .0000:0
14.00_2aO .001220 .000595 .000158 .O00t!C
16.0017uO .000920 .000"_5 .000108 .000000
18 .0017u0 .000920 .009u85 .000:08 .000000
19,0017uO .000920 ,o00u_S .O0010B .000000
20 .0017"0 .000920 .000u85 .000:108.000000
21 .001740 .000920 .000"S5 .000108 .00000C
24 .001700 .000900 .000_70 .000100 .000500
25 .001700 .000900 .000a70 .000100 .000000
28 .000500 .000300 .000170 .000060 .000000
31 .000S00 .000300 .000170 .000060 .000000
37 .000000 .000000 .000100 .000000 .000000
38 .000000 .000000 .000000 .000000 .000000
54 .000000 .000000 .000000 .000000 .000000
55 .000000 .000000 .000000 .000000 .000000
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TABLE7
PROBABILITYCONDITIONALON AN ACCIDENTTHATn OR MORE
PLANESARE EXPOSEDTO AN EXPOSUREOF E OR LARGER
Case: Aggregate Day
ExposureE (fs/m3)
lO3 lO4 lO5 lO6 lO7
2 ".017o00 .010920 .0U5800 .000370 .000_2
4 .016700 .0102o0 .005_00 .002300 ,O00_u2
7 .01_700 .Oi02bO .005u00" .002300 .O00_aZ
10.0lSuO0 .009_60 .005100 ,002150 .000_12
Ii .01_300 .00_360 .OOu_O0 .001850 .000262
12 .009600 .00o5b0 .003600 .001750 .000202
13 .009800 .00D560 .00?600..001750 .000262
14 .007900 .0053b0 .002800 .001350 .0002_2
Numberof 16 .007900 .005360 .002800 .001350 .0002b2
Planesn 18 .C07000 .00u760 .002300 .001150 .0002_2
19 .006_00 .00_500 .002200 .001120 .0002_0
20 .O05BO0 .O0_QO0 .001800 .000920 .000170
21 .005800 .003900 .00_800 .0009_0 .000170
24 .005800 .003900 .001800 .0009_0 .000170
25 .005800 .003900 .001800 .000920 .000170
28 .005600 .002900 .001800 .000920 .000170
31 .005100 .003500 .001600 .000870 .000150
37 .005100 .003500 .001600 .000870 .0"00150
38 .003700 .002600 .001200 .000770,.000110
54 .003700 .002600 .001200 .000770 .0001!0
55 .001500 .000900 .000300 .000170 .000000
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TABLE8
PROBABILITYCONDITIONALON AN ACCIDENTTHAT n OR MORE
PLANESARE EXPOSEDTO AN EXPOSUREOF E OR LARGER
Case: Aggregate Night
ExposureE (fs/m3)
103 104 105 106 107
2 .00"30u .00_o_0 .001296 .000500 .000075
4 ,O0"._Ou ,002666 ,00129o .000500 .00007_i
7 ,00"27" ,0026".6 ,00127b ,000a95 ,00C07.'-
10 ,00"25" ,002o32 ,001271 ,000"93 ,00007_:
11 ,00"22" ,002612 ,001257 ,000_85 ,000075
12 ,00".22" ,002612 ,001257 ,000"85 ,00007.:
13 ,OOu19". ,002592 ,001237 ,D00"76 .000072
14 ,00"19" ,002592 ,001237 ,000"76 ,00067._
16 ,0036"" ,002252 ,001107 ,O00"lu ,O00CSb
Number of 18 ,00_I"" ,001952 ,0009B7 ,00075_ ,00C05_
19 ,00_I"0 ,001950 ,000985 ,00075u ,0000_BP]anesn 20 .003!'0 .001950 .000985 ,00035_ .0C005b
21 .0031"0 .001950 .000985 .00035"..000056
24 ,00_100 .O01e_O .000970 .0003"6 .00005e
25 .002"00 .001330 .000670 .0001"6 .00001o
28 .001200 .000730 .000370 .000106.OOOCIB
31 .001200 .000730 .000370 .000106 .000Cle
37 ,000200 ,000130 ,000070 .000016 ,000'006
38 ,000200 ,000130 .000070 ,000016 ,00_00o
54 ,000000 .000000 .000000 .000000 ,O00CO0
55 .000000.000000.000000.000000.000000
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TABLE9
PROBABILITYCONDITIONALON AN ACCIDENTHATn OR MORE
PLANESAREEXPOSEDTO AN EXPOSUREOF E OR LARGER
Case: Aggregate Gate
Exposure E (fs/m3)
103 104 105 106 107
2 .0105_h .007/86 .0036d! .001787 .000_77
.O_.u._'_a.007186 003681 001787 .000777
7 .r.'1053".007186 .0036_! .001787 .000977
i0 .01051" .007172 .00367o .001785 .000377
ii .009dda .006752 .003u62 .001677 .0003"7
12 .019d8" .006752 .003"62 .001677 .000_Z7
13 .00985" .006732 .003_2 •001668 .O00_Zu
14 .0098_-_ .00o732 .O03=".q .001668 .0003-_u
16 .O09BOu .006o92 .003"22 .001656 .0003-_0
Numberof 18 .008,_0".005792 .002802 .00139b .00029019 .OOBO00 .005530 .00.q700 .001366 .O00-_d6PIanes n
20 -007-_00 -00u930 ,002300 .001166 .O002_b
21 ,007200 .OOU9_O .002300 .001166 .000226
24 0007200 ,00"930 .O0.q300 ,O011bb .000228
25 .00o500 .OOU_30 .002000 .000906 .00018B
28 .006500 ,00u330 .002000 .0009o6 .000168
31 .005800.003930 .001800 .00091o.0001o8
37 .005300 •003630 .001o70 .000886 .C0015o
38 0003900 •002730 ,001270 0000786 .00011o
54 .003700 .002600 .001200 .000770 .000110
55 .001500 .000900 .000300 .000170 .O0000C
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TABLE10
-. PROBABILITY'CONDITIONALON AN ACCIDENTTHATn OR MORE
PLANESARE EXPOSEDTO AN EXPOSUREOF E OR LARGER
Case:AggregateMaintenance
ExposureE (fs/m3)
103 104 10S 106 107
2 .011370.O0_uO0.O0_u1_.00108_,0000"0
4 .010_70.0057,0.00_015.00101_.0000_0
7 .010_0 .005720.002995.00!008.O000uO
10 .0091"0.005120.002695.000858.000010
11 .0075_0.00"220.002195.000658.000010
12 .00"I"0.002"20.001_95.000558.000010
13 .O0"!uD.002"20.001395.000558.000010
14 .00_2"0.001220.000595.000158.0000!0
16 .0017"0.0009_0.000"85.000108.000005
Number of 18 .0017u0 ,000920 ,O00u8S .000108 .000000
Planes n 19,0D17UD ,000920 ,000_85 ,000108 .DO0000
20 .0017_0 ,000920 ,000u85 .000108 ..000000
21,001?uO ,000920 ,000_85 ,00010B ,000000
24 .001700 ,000900 .000u70 ,000100 .000000
25 .00!700,000900.000,70.000100.O0000C
28 ,000500 ,000300 ,000170 ,O000bO ,000000
31 .000500.000300.000170.000060.O0000O
37 .000000 .000000 .000000 .000000 .OODOOC
38 .000000 .000000 .000000 .000000 .000000
54 .000000 ,000000 .000000 .000000 .000000
55 .000000 ,000000 .000000 .000000 .000000
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TABLE11
PROBABILITY.CONDITIONALON AN ACCIDENTTHAT n OR MORE
ARE EXPOSEDTO AN EXPOSUREOF E OR LARGER
Dverall
ExposureE (fs/m3)
103 104 105 106 107
2 .022"00 .Ol"CiO .007355 .003018 .000"17
4 .021500.017350 .00_955 .0029h8 .000"17
7 .021"70 .013330 .00o975 .0029.3 .000"17
10 .620170 .012630 .00oo35 .002793 .0003o7
ii "017°70 .011930 .005935 .002"92 .000337
12 .01.570 .009520 .005135 .002393 .000237
13 .01"5_0 .009510 .005115 .00228_ .0003_-"
14 .0126"0 .0082:C .00"315 .OOl9S" .00032u
16 .0121"0 .008010 .00"185 .0019_" .000_-_0
18.0l07aG .007110 .003585 .00162" .000290
19 .0103.0 .006850 .003a85 .00159. .O00:s6
20 .0095u0 .006250 .003085 .00179a .OOC_:_
21 .oosguo .005650 .002785 .00127" .00022B
24 .00_900 .0058R0 .002770 .001266 .000228
25 .006_00 .005220 .002"70 .001066 .O001d6
28 .007000 .O0"b30 .002170 .001026 .000188
31.006RO0 .00"2._0..001970 .000976 .0001o8
37 .005300 .002630 .001670 .000u86 .000156
38 "00_900 .002730 .001270 .000786 .O00llo
54 .002700 .00_600 .001200 .000770 .000110
55 .001500 .000900 .000?00 .000170 .000000
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TABLE12
PROBABILITYTHATn ORMOREPLANESAREEXPOSED.
TOAN EXPOSUREOF E ORLARGER
Day
ExposureE (fs/m3)
lO3 lO4 IO5 lO6 lO7
2 :0_7200 .018u32 .009000 .00u6uO .00099_
4 .027200 .018_32 ,009600 .O0_b"O .009u_
7 ,027200 ,018u32 .009600 .00"6b0 .000u_
10 .027200 .018_72 .009600 .OOUouO .000Q06
11 .02_280 ,017152 .008960 .00_320 .0008_H
12 .025280 .017152 .008960 .00_320 .OOOb?o
13 ,0252_0 .017152 .0089b0 .004320 ,OOO_b
1A .0252B0 .017152 .008960 .004320 .OOO_3G
16 .025260 .017152 .008960 .00a320 .OOO_3o
18 .072u00 .01S_32 .007360 .003080 .0007u2
19 .021120 .01u_00 .0070u0 .00358u .0007_6
20 .01e560 .012-80 .005760 .00294a .0005u_
21 .018560 .012a80 .005760 .O029uu .0005u4
24 .01d560 .012480 .005760.0029_u .0005=4
25 .0185o0 .012u80 .005760 .0029_u .00054u
28 .018560 .012,80 .005760 .0029u_ .0005_4
31 .016320 .011200 .005120 .00278_ .000480
37 .016320 .011200 .005120 .00278_ .000=S6
38 .0118_0 .008320 .0038_0 .002_6, .000=3:
54 .0118_0 .008320 .0038,0 .002ubu .000_=
55 .OOU800 .002880 .000960 .0005_ .000000
81
WORKINGHEMORANDUMNO. 3 CASE:81857-04 DATE:11 SEPTEMBER1979PAGE:26
TABLE13
ANNUALPROBABILITYTHAT n OR MORE PLANESARE EXPOSED
TO AN EXPOSUREOF E OR LARGER
Case: AggregateGate Night
ExposureE (fs/m3)
103 104 105 106 107
2 .00o500 .00u5o3 .002!79 .001080 .000200
4 .000509 .00_5o3 .002179 .00!080 .000209
7 .006_09.00u503 .002179 .001080 .000_09
i0 .OObuU5 .00_518 .0021b3 .001073 ".000209
ii .00o3_9.OOU_3_.002118.0010_ .00020o
12 .O0o_u9. .OOuuS_ .002118 .0010_8 .000206.
Numberof 13 .00b253 .00u390 .00205u .001019 .000199
l& .00o253 .00_390 .00205u .001019 .00C199Planes n
16 .006093 .00u262 .001990 .000°d0 .O001ob
18 .00_u93 .003302 .001o0o .0007_6 .COO!So
19 .00_80 .003296 .00=600 .000787 .00918o
20 .00u_80 .003296 .001600 .000787 .900180
21 .OOa_SO .003296 .0_600 .000787 .000180
24 .OOUa_O .003296 .001600 .000787 .O00lSb
25 .0022u0 .001376 .0006u0 .O001a7 .000056
28 .0022=0 .001376 .0006_0 .0001_7 .dO005_
31 .0022a0 .001376 .O00ouO .0001_7 .00005b
37 .0006_0 .000a16 .00022u .000051 .000019
38 .0000_0 .009u16 .00022_ .000051 .000019
54 .000000 .000000 .000000 .000000 .000000
55 .000000 .000000 .000000 .000000 .000000
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TABLE14
ANNUALPROBABILITYTHATn OR MORE PLANESARE EXPOSED
TO AN EXPOSUREOF E OR LARGER
Case: AggregateMaintenanceDay
°.
Exposure(fs/m3)
103 104 105 106 107
2 .02o120 .01o5!_ .0089o0 .0029_u .OOOD9o
A .O_b_O .O_u_O0 .O07bHO .0027_0 .000090
7 .026_u0 .01uuO0 .OO76aO .002720 .OOOOgo
' iO .0;20_0 .012u80 .0007;0 .OO_2uO .OOOOOC
11 .016960 .009000 .00_!20 .DO1600 .000000
12 .OOoDbD .O038uD .DD256D .00!28D .'OODOOD
13 .006080 .0038_D .OOZS6O .0D!280 .000000
14 .O0000D .000000 .000000 .O00OO0 .OOOO00
Number of 16 .DOOOOD .DO,ODD ,O000OO .DODOOD .DOODDO
Planes n 1F .000000 .000000 .000000 ,000000 .000000
19 .000000 .000000 .O0000O .000000 .000000
20 .O00CO0 .000000 .O0000O .O0000O .000000
21 ,O000OO .000000 .000000 .OOO900 .000000
24 .O00OO0 .000000 .000000 .O0000O .O00COO
25 .000000 .000000 .O000OO ,000000 .O00_OO
28 000000 .O000OO .000000 .000000 .000000
31 000000 .000000 .000000 .000000 .000000
37 .O00OO0 .000000 .OOOOOO .OOOO00 .OOO000
38 .000000 .000000 .000000 .O000DO .000000
54 .O0000O .OOO00O .OOO000 .000000 .O00OOO
55 .O00OO0 .O00OO0 .O000OO .OOOO00 .OOOO00
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TABLE15
ANNUALPROBABILITYTHATn OR MORE PLANESARE EXPOSED
TO AN EXPOSUREOF E OR LARGER
Case_____£.-AggregateMaintenanceNight
ExposureE (fs/m3)
103 104 105 106 107
2 .O072bu .003968 .001968 .000522 .0000_=
4 .0072_a .003968 .O019Dd .0005=_ .000032
7 .0071oB ,O0_90u .00190u .000506 .0000_Z
I0 .007168 .00390_ .00190_ .000506 .000032
Ii .007268 .00390a .oolgoa .000506 .0000_=
Numberof 12 .007168 .00990_ .O019Da .000506 .000032
Planes n 13 .007108 .00_90a .00190_ .000506 .000032
14 .007168 .00390_ .O(_90a .000506 .000032
16 .005568 .00=9a4 .00155_ .0003a6 .000000
18 .005568 .0029_u .001552 .0003a6 .000000
19 .005568 .O029uu .001552 .O003ub .OOOODO
20 .005_68 .O0_gaa .001552 .0003a6 .000000
21 .005568 .0029a, .001552 .0003a6 .000000
24 .ODSaa0 .002880 .00150. .000320 .000000
25 .005..0 .002880 .00150. .000320 .000000
28 .001600 .000960 .0005_. .000192 .000000
31 .001600 .000960 .O005uu .000192 .000000
37 .000000 .000000 .000000 .000000 .000000
38 .000000 .000000 .000000 .000000 .000000
54 .000000 .000000 .000000 .000000 .000000
55 .0000D0 .000000 .000000 .000000 .000000'
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TABLE16
ANNUALPROBABILITYTHATn OR MORE PLANESARE EXPOSED
TO AN EXPOSUREOF E OR LARGER
%
Case: Aggregate Day
ExposureE (fs/m3)
lo3 lo4 loS lo6 lo7
2 .05u_20 .03_9_ .018500 .00758_ .00109_
4 .C_3uuO .0_8_ .017_0 .0073u0 .00109_
7 .053uuO .0_2832 .017=80 .007360 .00109_
I0 .0u9280 .0_0912 .01o2=0 .006860 .000998
ii .0u22_0.02o75= .01_080 .005920 .000_38
12 .031_b0 .0=0992 .011520 .005600 .000B38
Number of
13 .O_i3bO .02099= .011520 .005600 oOOOb2a
Planesn 14 .0152_0 .017!52 .0089o0 .00_320 .O00_b
16 .0=5280 .01715= .008960 .00.320 .000_
18 .022_00 .015232 .00[3o0 .003680 .O007u=
19 .021120.01a"00.0070.0.00358u.0007_D
20 .0185o0 .012_80 .005760 .0029_a .O005aa
21 .018560.012u80.005700.0029u_.O005u_
24 .018560 .0!=_80 .005760 .O029uu .0005_"
25 .018560 .012a80 .005760 .O029ua .O005u_
28 .018560 .012_80 .005760 .0029u" .0005au
31 .016320 .011200 .005120 .00278a .O00aBO
37 .016320 .011200 .005120 .00278a .000_80
38 .Ol18aO .008_20 .0038_0 .O02U6u .000752
54 .OllBuO .008_20 .0038u0 .002u6_ .000_5_
55 .00_800 .002_80 .000960 .0005_ .O00GO0
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TABLE17
ANNUALPROBABILITYTHAT n OR MORE PLANESARE EXPOSED
"TOAN EXPOSUREOF E OR LARGER
Case: Aggregate Night
Exposure E (fs/m3)
103 104 105 106 -107
2 .013773 .008531 .00uI-7 .O01bOl .0002"!
4 .013773 .0085_I .00_I"7 .001001 .0002ui
7 .013677 .008"67 .00-082 .001585 .0002uI
10 .01_,61_.008u22 .00"067 .001579 .0002"I
Ii .012517 .008358 .00_022 .001553 .0002"0
12 .013E17 .008358 .00_022 .001553 .000__'0
Numberof 13 .013u21 .00829" .00_958 .00152" .00023:
Planesn 14 .013"21 ,00820_ .003958 .00152" ,000231
16 .0!1o61 .007205 .0035a2 .001326 .000180
18 .010061 .0062"6 .003158 .0011,_ .000160
19 .0100_8 .0062"0 .003152 .001133 .000186
20 .0100a8 .0062a0 .003152 .001133 .000186
21 ,0100"8 .0062a0 .003152 .001133 .000186
24 .009920 .006176 .00310" .001107 .000186
25 .007680 .00"256 .0021u" .000"67 .000058
28 .0038"0 .002336 .00118" .000339 .000058
31 .0038a0 .002336 .00118= .000339 .000058
37 .0006u0 .000"16 .00022" .000051 .000019
38 .0006"0 .000u16 .00022_ .000051 .000019
54 .000000 .000000 .000000 .000000 .000000
55 ,000000 .000000 .000000 .000000 .000000
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TABLE18
PROBABILITYTHATn OR MORE PLANESARE EXPOSED
TO AN EXPOSUREOF E OR LARGER
Gate
- Exposure E (fs/m3)
103 104 105 106 107
2 .033709 .022995 .011779 .005720 .001207
4 .033709 .022995 .011779 .003720 .001207
7 .033709 .022995 .011779 .005720 .001207
i0 .0336u5 .022950 .011763 .005713 .001207
ii .03_b29 .02160o .011078 .O0_3ob .O01Cuu
12 .031629 .021606 .011078 .005368 .OOlOuo
13 .071533 .02!5u2 .Oll01a .00_339 .001037
14 .031533 .0215u2 .01101a .00_339 .001037
16 .031373 .021ala .010950 .005300 .0010_
18 .02o893 .018_ .008966 .00u_68 .000928
19 .025600 .0176% .0086u0 .00a371 .000922
20 .0_30_0 .015776 .007360 .003731 .000720
21 .0270uO .015776 .007360 .00_731 .000730
24 .0230_0 .015776 .007360 .003731 .000730
25 .020B00 .013856 .006_00 .003091 .00000_
28 .020800 .013836 .006_00 .003091 .000607
31 .018560 .012576 .005760 .002931 .000S36
37 .016960 .011616 .O053uu .002835 .000_99
38 .012_80 .00873b .OOa06_ .002515 .000371
54 .0118_0 .008320 .0038u0 .O02_b_ .000352
55 .00_800 .0028_0 .000960 .0005_a .000000
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TABLE19
ANNUALPROBABILITYTHAT n OR MORE PLANESARE EXPOSED
TO AN EXPOSUREOF E OR LARGER
°.
Case: Aggregate Maintenance
Exposure E (fs/m3)
103. 104. 105 106 107
2 .O_b_6_ .020u_O .0!0928 .007_oo .900!:8
4 .03350_ .01_68 .O09_u_ .00_2_2 .00C138
7 .037u08 .01830" .00958 u .003226 .OOO12b
10 .0292=8 .Oib3_= .09B6: a .0027=b .000C32
Ii .02a128 .0!750a .00702_ .002!06 .00007:
12 .0!3=a8 .0077uu .OOu_ou .001786 .0000_"Numberof 13 .O132ub .0077_" .OOUU6_ .00178o .00097_
Planes n 14 .007168 .00390a .00190u .000506 .0000_
16 .0055b_ .00294_ .001552 .0003u6 .000009
18 ,005568 .O029uu .001552 .0003u6 .O000OC
19 .0055o8 .0029_u .001552 .O007u6 .O0000_
20 .005568 .o0:guu .001_52 .000_6 .000000
21 .0055_8 .O029_u .001552 .OOO?U6 .000000
24 .OOSUUO .002880 .00150_ .000_20 .000000
25 .005u_0 .002880 .00150" .000_20 .O000DO
28 .O01bOD .000950 .00054_ .000192 .00CC90
31 .00!o00 .000900 .OO05uu .000192 .000090
37 .O00DO0 .000000 .000000 .O0000O .000000
38 .000000 .000000 .000000 .000000 .OODOOD
54 .000000 .000000 .000000 .000000 .000000
55 .000000 .000000 .000000 .000000 .000C00
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TABLE20
PROBABILITYTHAT n OR MORE PLANESARE EXPOSED
TO AN EXPOSUREOF E OR LARGER
Overall
Exposure (fs/m3)
103 104 105 106 107
2 .071680 .O'u8_,2.02_536 .OOQ65b .0013_-
4 .Obt_800 .0"2720 .02225b .009"?" .001_-_u.
7 .06870" .0"265b .022192 .009"18 .0013_b
i0.0ouS"" .O"O"Ib .021232 .O0_°e8 .0012_
Ii .05750u .036_5b .01_992 .907978 .00107_
12 .0"662_ .030u9o .0!6"32 .007658 .001078
13 .0u65_8 .030"32 .0163o8 .007629 .90106°
14 .0"0""8 .026592 .013808 .OOb3u9 .00!069
16 .038u"8 .025632 .013392 .006157 .O01CZ'
18 .0_,3o8 ,022752 .011,72 .005!o7 .0009_'o
19 .033968 .021920 .011152 .005101 .0009_',"
20 .030528 .020000 .009872 .00,"61 .000730
21 .02_608 .018720 .008912 .00,077 .0007_0
24 .02Bu89 .01865b .0088b_ .OOu051 .0007_0
25 .0_62a0 .01b736 .00790_ .003u11 .000602
28 .0:2uO0 .01h_16 .00690_ .003283 ,000602
31 .020169 .013536 .00630a .003123 .0005_,8
37 .016069 .011b16 .005300 .002835 .000"9°
38 .012_80 .008736 .00_06_ .00,9515.000371
54 .0118"0 .008320 .003800 .O02_b_ .000352
55.00u800 .002880 .000960 .9905u,, .000009
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TABLE21
AVERAGEFLEETMIX FOR AIRCRAFTEXPOSEDIN ACCIDENTS
% Small % Medium % Large
Maintenance Day 79,2 2,1 18,7
Maintenance Night 70,5 8,2 21,3
Gate Day 79,2 5,5 15,3
Gate Night 75,2 6.6 18,2
Maintenance Overall 75,5 4.7 19,8
Gate Overall 78,7 5,7 15,6
Day Overall 79,2 5,0 15,8
Night Overall 72,.9 7,4 19,7
Overall 78,0 5,4 16.6
9O
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